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ABSTRACT 
 
This work examines the accidents and shortcomings inexperienced American pilots 
experienced during the opening days of Operation TORCH and attributes these mishaps 
to inadequate training and inexperience. Through a comparative approach, American 
training programs and text are contrasted against those of the British. By analyzing the 
base training methods of the RAF and observing their effectiveness when used in the 
North Africa and Mediterranean theatre at Malta provides a solid example where a well 
developed and battle exposure prove effective. This frame work served as a framework to 
compare the deficiencies of American airmen.    
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 Introduction 
 
In late 1942, the sands of Morocco and its adjacent waters became crash sites for 
many American military pilots and their aircraft. Operation TORCH involved an 
American invasion of Vichy-held ports in French North Africa, particularly in Morocco.  
The United States Army Air Corps and Naval Aviation suffered heavy casualties during 
the opening days of Operation TORCH, starting on the morning of November 8, 1942. 
The mistakes made by American pilots can be better understood when compared to the 
successful performance of the Royal Air Force. The Americans and British faced entirely 
different enemies, who presented them with different levels of challenges. The RAF on 
Malta fought against veteran and determined professionals of the Luftwaffe as well as 
Mussolini’s Regia Aeronautica, in contrast to the less formidable Vichy forces faced by 
the Americans. A sharp contrast existed between the performances of the ill-trained and 
unprepared American air forces and the veteran British Royal Air Forces defending Malta 
and the critically important east-west convoy route through the Mediterranean during 
1940-45. Throughout the 1940 Battle of Britain and the Axis’ air siege of Malta during 
1941-42 the British gained valuable experience.  
The contrast between the abilities of the two Allies involved in Operation 
TORCH is the crux of this work. It is a comparative history that compares the actual 
performances of the RAF and the American air units involved in TORCH. This thesis 
examines and discusses the shortcomings of the American Army Air Corps and naval air 
arm, in particular their fighter aircraft pilots. These include the lack of proper pilot 
 2 
training, the state of preparedness for combat missions, and the use of underpowered 
aircraft.  
This study fits into the historiography of North Africa in World War II. It 
parallels a recent major work by historian Rick Atkinson, his An Army at Dawn: The War 
in North Africa, 1942-1943. Atkinson accurately portrays the American army in this 
theater as initially ill-trained and ill-equipped for war against Germany’s Panzer Armee 
Afrika. In his analysis of the American ground forces, he excludes the Army Air Corps 
division, even though this arm was instrumental to the success of American military 
forces fighting in North Africa. I argue that the Army Air Corps and the United States’ 
naval air arm all suffered from a state of inexperience and did not achieve adequate 
readiness for battle. I contrast the American pilots’ performance in the opening of 
TORCH to the proficiency level attained by the British Royal Air Force by late 1942 
from valuable experience gained from their ordeal on and above the Western Desert and 
Malta. The second part evaluates the problems encountered by the ill-equipped American 
fighter pilots in the invasion of North Africa during Operation TORCH.  
This work uses primary sources to assess the level of the American air units’ 
initial performances in Operation TORCH in French Morocco. The US air units played a 
large role in the first days of the Operation and experienced unexpected heavy losses 
from pilot error, inexperience, and insufficient training. In order to undertake an accurate 
comparative history I also turned to primary sources that contributed to accurately 
examine and gauge the British pilots’ effectiveness. The most important source covering 
American pilots came from the official after action reports. These reports gave the 
clearest unaltered account on the losses and outcome of the sorties flown during the 
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opening days of TORCH. I examined and researched the after action reports of the 33rd 
Fighter Group and files of the naval groups involved in order to bring relevant primary 
source data to this work. These after action reports served as my key primary source. At 
the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland (NACP), I 
sifted through a total of fourteen boxes of archival naval records including photographs, 
squadron records, action reports, and debriefing forms. The after action reports on the 
military operations reveal the staggering number of American planes missing in action 
and the large number of casualties caused by pilot error. Data from these archives 
contained the official record of the 33rd Fighter Group’s operational history, from 
November 8, 1942, to February 29, 1944. In addition I turned to naval records of the 
Wildcats launched in the first day of the operation. Boxes containing the records broken 
down by squadrons VF-41, VF-9, VF-26, VF-28 yielded a wealth of data, forms, and 
photographs. The American carriers involved in the operation included the USS Ranger, 
USS Suwannee, USS Sangamon, and the USS Santee. I found archived records cataloged 
specifically for the USS Santee, USS Sangamon, and the USS Ranger at the NACP. These 
official records proved invaluable to my work. 
Since a large portion of my thesis investigates the effectiveness of both British 
and American pilot training programs, I turned to other sources researching an array of 
original manuals and training materials used in the programs. The British flight training 
curriculum required texts by David Hay Surgeoner and the practical flight training 
manual edited by Leonard Taylor. I acquired accesses to these through the Museum of 
Flight archives as well as copies of materials of the American training program. Not only 
did I study these materials written for the cadets, I also examined the Instructors 
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Handbook of Advanced Training written by Henry Walton, an invaluable source to 
understand the high standards with which the instructors were expected to teach their 
program. The equivalent air navigation manual, Fm 1-30 Air Corps Field Manual of Air 
Navigation, used by in the American pilot training program, is a gross simplification of 
Surgeoner’s work on the same subject. It was important to go to these sources for an 
accurate comparison of the two training programs as well as their conjunction with 
secondary sources for an accurate and well informed comparison and analysis. 
This thesis utilizes information from pilots’ journals and memoirs. Using material 
written from the pilots themselves provides a fresh perspective to uncovering their 
trainings effectiveness and recounting events and their actions from their own point of 
view. Diaries of Lieutenant Wordell and Lieutenant Seiler, two American Wildcat pilots, 
published shortly after TORCH, in 1943, provide insight into problems that bedeviled 
during the operation. Other primary works published that year include Spitfire pilot 
George Beurling’s account of his experiences over Malta. Memoirs written later include 
George Barclay’s account as a fighter pilot. This work appeared in print only in 1976. 
Lord James Douglas Hamilton assembled and published a superb collection of diaries of 
fighter pilots who defended Malta.  The island was under siege during 1940-1943, and 
these aviators developed further the methods of British air combat. Their diaries reveal in 
great detail how they defend the island from Axis attack.  
Pilots alone did not produce the only informative diaries: Lieutenant-General 
Lewis Brereton’s diary, particularly, yielded important information regarding leadership, 
base structure, and operations. Along with the diary and memoirs of specific pilots, I 
consulted training manuals and original aircraft maintenance and operation handbooks to 
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obtain data on the specifications and features of their aircraft and equipment. I utilized 
these technical sources to uncover possible explanations of their accidents and mistakes. 
Archival photographs of the North African air bases provided insight on the configuration 
and conditions of the units. Beyond diaries, manuals, and photographs, I examined 
journals, speeches, and newspapers.  
  I explored public opinion on these topics evident in The London Times and 
excerpts from British Parliamentary Papers. These sources, although biased, provide 
primary perceptions of the events. Some of the articles reveal mishaps of the American 
air units during Operation TORCH. Along with newspapers, I utilized relevant speeches 
delivered by Winston Churchill. A source that directly assessed the problem of 
insufficient training and the high frequency of air accidents was the American GI 
magazine, Yank and the Army Weekly. One of its articles addressed the recurring 
regularity of Army Air Corps accidents and mishaps, with commentary from General 
Henry H. Arnold, the commanding general in 1942 of the US Army’s air arm. When 
dealing with these primary sources, it was important to be mindful of their intended 
audience. Beyond chronological journals, Army Air Corps publications proved to be very 
helpful for my research. These official publications laid out the structure and organization 
of the American training program, which, when juxtaposed with publications from the 
Air Corps newsletter, addressed safety concerns connected to training. From this, the 
severity of America’s problems surrounding training started to come into focus. 
Secondary sources proved to be of great help. The majority of them dealt 
separately with the Americans and the British in the North African theater. I compare the 
capabilities and training leveled on both air forces. The contrast between the data pulled 
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from an array of primary and secondary sources revealed that American aviators’ level of 
training, preparedness, hardware, and effectiveness lagged far behind those in the RAF.  
Wesley Frank Craven’s multivolume work is one of the most extensive works 
written about the air forces of World War II. Craven provided details pertaining to 
American training, deployment, and operations. Many squadron histories omitted 
statistics concerning accidents. For this reason, it is necessary to turn to diaries and after 
action reports to reveal the actual nature of these abundant American mishaps. John 
Lambert’s work, Wildcats Over Casablanca, November 1942 Operation Torch, proved to 
be a particularly valuable source; it documented many of the accidents and problems the 
American Wildcat pilots experienced. This information was elsewhere conspicuously 
absent. I uncovered more American mistakes as I investigated Edgar F. Raines, Jr’s, 2002 
article in Air Power History, “Disaster off Casablanca: Air Observation Posts in 
Operation Torch and the Role of Failure in Institutional Innovation.” These sources 
contributed greatly to my work, particularly when I crosschecked and reconsidered them 
by utilizing information from primary sources.  
 I approach this history from a variety of different perspectives. Accordingly, I 
have included an Italian source from which I translated and extracted the Italian 
perspective on their campaign against the British in Malta. An understanding of the 
unique specifications of all the fighter aircraft involved proved vital when comparing 
their performance against each other in combat. I gathered this information from a 
combination of primary sources that include the actual aircraft type manufacture 
maintenance manuals and the highly accurate performance specifications provided by 
Enzo Angelucci and Paolo Matricardui in their Military Aircraft Encyclopedia.  
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A pattern emerged from my research: America’s air forces arrived in combat un-
prepared for war. In contrast, Great Britain’s RAF employed well-seasoned tactics to 
achieve lethal effect. Following the 1940 Battle of Britain, the RAF benefited greatly 
from its experiences defending Malta and engaging the Luftwaffe and the Regia 
Aeronautica over the desert. These missions resulted in adaptability, a heightened level of 
effectiveness, and success. I found it useful to explore events surrounding the siege of 
Malta to comprehend the environment where the RAF responded to the challenges of 
defending this strategic island as well using it for offense. During the siege, the RAF 
managed to continue to attack Axis convoys vital to Afrika Korps offensives. Multiple 
secondary sources provided this information from different perspectives. Emile 
Bradford’s Siege Malta 1940-1943 contained invaluable charts and tables containing 
statistics relating to attacks and operations. Bradford also provided an extremely detailed 
account of the events from multiple perspectives, including those of Maltese civilians. 
James Holland’s Fortress Malta: An Island under Siege 1940-43 provided a framework 
and timeline where I could assess first-hand accounts from pilot diaries and memoirs. As 
I aimed to develop a comparison of the British RAF to the abilities of the US air forces, I 
needed to examine British aerial attack tactics, especially those relating to fighter 
interception and torpedo bombing from Malta. Kenneth Poolman’s Night Strike from 
Malta: 830 Squadron RN and Rommel’s Convoys emerged as one of the most rewarding 
sources for this task, as it detailed these strike missions and included diagrams and pilot 
accounts. Samuel Elliot Morrison’s meticulously detailed work on the actions of the 
American Navy allowed me to construct an accurate framework on the details of the US 
Navy carrier operations during the opening days of TORCH. 
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My work, uniquely, assesses the level of performance and preparedness of the 
American air forces in a comparative framework involving an RAF counterpart. My 
comparative work reflects my research on the RAF and American air elements in actively 
explaining and evaluating their performance over Malta and over French Morocco. This 
study reveals the difference in skill and state of readiness between these fighter units. My 
secondary sources cover these air powers separately. I draw a stark division between the 
two by comparing training, combat experience, and utility. The diaries reveal that the 
pilots of the two Allied nations in 1942 possessed very different levels of preparedness. 
This thesis concludes that British military aviators by 1941 and 1942 were, generally, 
well trained pilots with substantial combat experience, both of which the American pilots 
lacked. Their inexperience and naivety regarding the reality of war made them far more 
likely than their RAF counterparts to make mistakes. Compared to the battle-hardened 
RAF, the training and performance of American air units during TORCH lagged far 
behind.  
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Prologue: Assessing Prewar Fighter Aircraft Development in Great Britain and 
the United States 
 
A number of political, economic, and ideological reasons account for the stark 
contrast between American and British aircraft and pilot training programs during the 
early years of the Second World War. Great Britain and America were at this time two 
very different entities, an empire and a republic, each with its distinctive traditions, 
economy, and emphasis in matters of defense. Historically, Britain long maintained a 
standing army of expertly trained professional soldiers serving its imperial aims of 
protecting its colonies and its home front. America’s military developed in quite an 
opposite way and consisted largely of state militias activated only in times of war. 
America’s peacetime standing army was quite minimal in size and often deficient in 
modernizing its equipment.  
Geographically speaking, Britain at home had only a narrow channel to protect 
itself from invasion while the borders of the United States fronted on two vast oceans and 
a huge gulf. In the years leading up to World War II, the British decided the best way for 
them to defend their homeland was to develop highly advanced fighter planes that could 
be used in conjunction with a network of radar and expertly trained pilots who would 
patrol in formations and protect the coast. Following the advice of Chief Air Marshal and 
leader of Fighter Command, Sir Hugh Dowding, and England allocated substantial 
resources into forming a strong, modern, and separate air force. This involved funding of  
research to build planes of sufficient high quality that they could compete against the 
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advanced fighters of the Luftwaffe. Additionally, the standardized courses set by the 
leaders of the RAF benefited greatly from the circumstance that they were created with 
only aviation in mind. These developments were in stark contrast to America’s efforts to 
create or bolster its program of military aviation.  
The two oceans and the Panama Canal stood as America’s buffers from invasion 
and, since, these areas were so vast, the fighter aircraft of the 1930’s could not 
sufficiently patrol and cover them as was the case with RAF fighters over the English 
Channel. In this way, the United States continued to focus its military preparedness on 
building a massive two ocean navy around battleships even though the Washington Naval 
Conference of 1921-22 had restricted the capital ship tonnage of the world’s maritime 
naval powers. America had no separate air force, for military aviation was included 
within the army and the navy. American naval aviation developed faster than the Army 
Air Corps, for it was viewed as a method to protect the fleet’s torpedo and dive bombers 
and missions performed by its battleships and lesser surface vessels. Partly for this 
reason, the American-made Navy Wildcat fighter had more firepower than the land-based 
P-40 Army Warhawk; fighters were seen as more useful to protect the all-important 
surface ships. In Operation Torch Wildcat pilots performed poorly because they had not 
been trained nor were intended to for use against targets on the coast or land based 
fighters.  
A major factor behind America possessing such poorly made fighter aircraft and 
creating a substandard training program was America’s socio-economic structure. As a 
capitalist free market nation, America depended on private enterprise, individuals seeking 
personal gain, and, even under the New Deal, private businesses continued to function as 
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profit-seeking entities. This extended to the prewar aviation industry. Unlike countries in 
Europe whose governments had been rapidly developing commercial and military 
aviation, American aviation grew from its barnstormers, private inventors and risk-taking 
investors. Their advances and gains were meant to benefit their own interests and not 
governed at all by military contributions. Government aircraft production lacked access 
to their innovation. This pattern of individualism did not fulfill the army’s needs for 
aircraft and pilot training programs, as it involved no standardized methods of producing 
aviators. 
 In the United States prior to the war, Congress had failed to adequately fund 
military aviation. This lack of funding dated back to 1918. At the executive level, 
Presidents Calvin Coolidge and Franklin Roosevelt privatized transporting air mail 
because the Army Air Corps experienced numerous plane crashes often caused by 
structural failures of its poorly developed and constructed aircraft. Vital airframe 
structures such as tails or wings had frequently broken off American Army planes flying 
mail during the interwar years. Aviation was relatively new and without adequate funding 
or standardized aircraft production the incentive and time for the American military to 
develop solid planes between 1918 and 1941were absent.  
In contrast to the operation of aviation for corporate profits, official goals for 
military aviation necessarily determined production figures. Many air-minded Americans, 
especially government officials and military leaders, strongly believed that strategic 
bombing was the key to winning wars. More time and energy was devoted to construct 
long range heavy bombers towards developing fighters. Only later in the war, during 
1943, did American generals discover that development of a long range fighter plane was 
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essential to the success of bombing missions. This type of aircraft needed to escort and 
protect the bombers to and from their targets. Newer, improved models of the P-51 
Mustang were rushed into production. Michael Sherry, in his Rise of American Air 
Power, discusses the prewar and the wartime debates surrounding America’s funneling 
energy and resources towards long range bombing. This mentality set American aviators 
apart from those of other nations like Germany, which relied almost solely on the tactical 
use of its fighter aircraft. In this America’s defense barrier provided by its wide oceans 
and supplemented by its mood of isolationism before Pearl Harbor facilitated long range 
strategic bombing and not short range tactical missions provided by fighter aircraft.   
 America uniquely among the powers of that time enjoyed vast amounts of 
resources and capital, despite the Great Depression of the 1930’s. America’s confidence 
in its ability to mass produce materials led to the production of poorly designed aircraft in 
greater numbers than could be reasonably crewed by competently trained personnel in 
preparation for war. America had lapsed into the mistake of relying on vast mass 
production of materials and setting unrealistic goals of production numbers without 
stepping back and considering their quality and functionality. 
 Political decisions placed new air bases in zones of temperate climates to better 
suit base occupants and their aircraft. Continental training facilities situated in difficult 
climates such as the desert regions of the American Southwest would have better 
prepared pilots for what they were to encounter over North Africa.  
 General James Doolittle, who prior to the war had advocated for aviation and 
commanded the famous raid on Tokyo in early 1942, later headed the Twelfth Air force 
in North Africa. He had been one of the first to develop instrument flying, although it had 
 13 
not been worked into the training curriculum. Doolittle had visited Europe before the war 
intending to gather information on foreign air forces and, because of that, he was aware 
that American aircraft development lagged far behind that of other powers, including 
Great Britain and Nazi Germany. He was not in a position at the time to change 
American policy nor had he the power to implement an improved training doctrine. After 
TORCH, Doolittle issued a newly revised and reworked training manual to fill the gaps 
made so evident during this Moroccan operation.     
 Had America broken out of its pattern of continuing to train government pilots 
poorly and build inferior aircraft, it should had fared much better in its opening campaign 
of the European war. If America had directed its attention to the advancements in aircraft 
design and performance in Europe, realizing how far behind it really was, things may 
have turned out much differently by the time of TORCH. America, however, remained 
essentially isolationist from the end of the First World War; it wanted nothing to do with 
European conflicts. In doing so it closed itself off to advanced developments made in 
military aviation. Congress chose to deny significant funding towards aviation and 
insisted that it remain subordinate inside the division separating the Army and the Navy. 
These circumstances help stagnant its growth and development. On the other side of the 
Atlantic, the British Royal Air Force had focused much attention to its fighter aircraft and 
pilot training programs. The British further separated their bombers into Bomber 
Command, an organization with its own leadership, training, and command structure. 
Fighter Command enjoyed parallel features. 
 The RAF’s projected role in the defense of its empire, the defense of its home 
islands, and the defense of its European allies made clear the importance of fighter 
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aircraft. For home defense, this meant fighters as the key tactical element. The 
Government fully supported the efforts and requests of the top leaders in the RAF. 
Figures such as Sir Hugh Dowding and Leigh Mallory led the way with their contribution 
towards the development of integrated tactics that best served the needs of home defense 
through the use of modern fighter aircraft. Sir Hugh Dowding commanded Fighter 
Command and established Britain’s advanced network of fighter defense enhanced by the 
use of radar.  Lee Mallory devised methods of using fighter planes in mass formations to 
maximize their effectiveness. The opening events of the Second World War, involving 
British fighters sent into combat to assist Britain’s allies in the Battle of France and 
Britain’s fighter defense against air attacks by the Germans in the Battle of Britain 
justified the early projections and efforts of Britain’s fighter command. Due to these early 
efforts, Britain, by the start of the Luftwaffe’s air offensive against her, was armed with 
the Chain Home network of coastal radar stations, together with fully modernized 
fighters manned by a pool of well trained pilots. The Battle of France and the Battle of 
Britain also generated useful survivors, veteran pilots with substantial air combat 
experience. This greatly benefited later RAF’s operations in the Mediterranean and North 
Africa.  
 The restrictions due to America’s Army Air Corps inclusion within the regular 
army caused American military aviation to be stifled in both funding and progress. The 
Army Air Corps had to share funding with the regular army. The U.S. Army generals 
were responsible for both ground and air operations and usually focused mainly on their 
infantry and armored units. Germany and Italy had superb air ministries that allowed for 
their sole focus on producing quality aircraft, devising purely aviation minded tactics, and 
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adequately equipping and training their pilots. The Royal Air Force, too, was separate 
from the Royal Navy and the ground forces, allowing it to mature by the standards of the 
late 1930’s. 
America’s preoccupation with constructing big-gunned surface war ships and its 
dreams of dominating the sky with of long range heavy bombers and its history of non-
standardized training created an environment in which fighter aircraft and pilot training 
were liable to be neglected. This thesis endeavors to demonstrate the dimension of this 
weakness. 
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Chapter 1 
The RAF Moves South to North Africa and the Mediterranean 
 
When Europe in World War II turned its attention to the sands of North Africa 
and the vital shipping routes of the Mediterranean, its leaders recognized that air 
supremacy would be vital. Earlier, during the spring 1940 French campaign, Britain’s 
Royal Air Force faced the dilemma of splitting its forces to both assist the French and 
protect their homeland. Sir Hugh Dowding, the head of the RAF’s Fighter Command, 
was extremely concerned with the rate of RAF fighter losses in its vain effort to prevent 
the fall of France. Following Germany’s swift victory in the Battle of France, Fighter 
Command experienced its ultimate test that summer as the Luftwaffe attacked the British 
homeland. During the Battle of Britain, Dowding’s Fighter Command excelled in 
strategic defense, aided by its Chain Home radar defense system and its technologically 
advanced fighter aircraft.  
After repelling Hermann Göring’s air assault against England, Britain prepared its 
air force to perform both offensively and defensively in North Africa and the 
Mediterranean. Dowding was no longer in control of Fighter Command; Sir William 
Sholto Douglas replaced him in October 1940.1
                                                 
1 Deighton, 226. 
 Britain’s Eighth Army in North Africa 
struggled, often unsuccessfully, against Rommel’s Afrika Korps during 1941 and 1942. 
The RAF needed to acquire effective offensive tactics that could assist Montgomery’s 
ground force’s efforts against the enemy. It learned to move from a defensive use of air 
power to new offensive maneuvers. The new theater of operation required a tactical air 
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component rather than a strictly defensive one. The RAF had trouble modifying its tactics 
to meet the desperate situation it faced in North Africa following the initial arrival of 
German units in February 1941. In North Africa, the British operated in a hostile climate 
and environment without the aid of radar. The Chain Home radar system existed only in 
Britain, so the pilots devised new methods to locate and destroy targets in North Africa.  
When the RAF operated beyond the British home islands, it risked severe 
setbacks. Additionally, Britain faced severe logistical problems in shipping Spitfires by 
sea to areas in the Mediterranean theater. These difficulties delayed the arrival of newer 
aircraft to the North African and Mediterranean area. Attacks by the Luftwaffe, Italy’s 
Regia Aeronautica, and Axis submarines contributed to the perils of shipping the planes. 
Attack aircraft alone proved useless without direction and leadership. Fortunately, strong 
British leaders directed its air forces in the Mediterranean in such a way that made it 
successful.   
In order to compete successfully against Axis planes, the British needed to devise 
a new air doctrine featuring stronger leadership. Air Marshal Tedder’s direction provided 
the change needed to turn the tide in the Mediterranean in Britain’s favor. Tedder’s plans 
allowed for smooth cooperation with the Americans as America’s air units prepared for 
action. Tedder’s contribution in conducting harmonious relations allowed American air 
units to perform in separate areas of operation, despite their inexperience. His focus on 
concentration, flexibility, and mobility eventually led to success for his air units in the 
second Battle of El Alamein. Tedder’s leadership also contributed to the integration of 
support from the Americans. 
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 The British found it necessary to devise a solution to coordinate their work with 
their new and inexperienced American allies in preparation for Operation TORCH. They 
were uncertain whether American units could be integrated, successfully, within their 
operations or capable of carrying out their potential assignments. Those tasked to tackle 
these problems included Air Marshal Tedder and the joint chiefs, as well as the American 
air commanders, particularly Generals Carl Andrew Spaatz and James Harold Doolittle. 
Allied Command assigned limited roles to the American air units, including the naval and 
army fighter forces. Nonetheless, America contributed to the success of TORCH by 
assisting in the capture of French-held shores of Morocco, and the Algerian port cities of 
Oran and Algiers. The joint Allied command expanded America’s role to include 
securing the three landing areas targeted by Operation TORCH. Allied air units under 
Tedder were directed against Rommel’s seaborne supply line. 
 These new combat operations, sinking Axis shipping, as well as attacking ground 
targets, differed greatly from the bomber and fighter intercept missions flown by British 
pilots during the Battle of Britain. RAF commanders directed Britain’s Desert Air Force 
to attack Axis communications, supply lines, and dug in positions of German ground 
units.2 Early on, the RAF did not direct its units to cooperate with ground forces and, 
with minor exceptions, the navy assumed it had enough power to operate on its own, 
without the assistance from the RAF.3
                                                 
2 George Barclay. Fighter Pilot (London: William Kmber, 1976), 194. 
3 A.H. Narracott, Air Power in War. (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1945), 13. 
 The battleship was still thought to be invincible as 
the ultimate weapon on the seas, until several instances of aircraft attacks disproved this 
idea. In May 1941 British aircraft attacked the mammoth German battleship Bismarck on 
its maiden and final mission against Allied shipping in the North Atlantic. The Royal 
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Navy Swordfish biplanes armed with aerial torpedoes disabled the Bismarck, leading to 
its destruction. The earlier British success in the Taranto attack of November 11, 1940, 
further demonstrated the effectiveness of airpower against capital warships.4 Its result 
stunned the Axis: obsolete British torpedo bomber aircraft sank Italian battleships. 
Military leaders together recognized the significant impact of aviation on the course of 
naval warfare. Planes could more effectively attack convoys than strike individual ships, 
since the later were usually faster. These lessons carried over to North Africa, as the RAF 
focused on attacking Axis shipping in the Mediterranean. The Allies used ships 
extensively for transporting planes to the North African front. England used both their 
aircraft carriers and carriers lent by the United States to ferry Spitfires to North Africa in 
order to replace their outmatched Beaufighters and Hurricanes. The American carrier 
Wasp encountered heavy enemy resistance while transporting Spitfires to the 
Mediterranean.5
Malta occupied a highly strategic position of strategic importance for the British 
Empire. The British acquired the island during the Napoleonic Wars, and Britain 
benefited from this colony’s key strategic geographic position during the Second World 
War. Before and during the war, the island functioned as a vital airfield and submarine 
base in the mid-Mediterranean, serving as the only British military outpost between 
Gibraltar, Alexandria, and the Suez Canal. The Axis’ aerial siege of Malta started on June 
 The state of Britain’s aviation technology in relation to its enemies made 
a difference in its survival. Britain now valued its own airpower for strategic strikes as 
well as defense in the Mediterranean, specifically the island of Malta.  
                                                 
4 Willamson Murry and Allan R. Millett. A War to be Won Fighting The Second World War. (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 2001),97.  
5Denis Richards and Hilaray St George Saunders. Royal Air Force 1939-1945 (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1954),164. 
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11, 1940, and lasted several years. The ferocity of the air attacks against Malta presented 
the British with a challenge and an opportunity to enhance their defensive and offensive 
capacity. They branched out offensively by attacking Axis convoys, thus reducing the 
Afrika Korps’ tactical capabilities in the desert. During the aerial siege of Malta, British 
pilots honed their air combat skills.    
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Chapter 2 
Aviation Technology: Axis Planes Fighting in the Desert 
 
The tactical application of British airpower depended to some extent on its aircraft 
hardware and technology. In many cases, this lagged behind German fighters designed by 
Willy Messerschmitt. In the desert, the RAF used its second-rate planes creatively until 
supplied with newer models. In order to understand the limitations of British aircraft, one 
needs to juxtapose the RAF’s planes’ attributes against the technology of opposing Axis 
fighter planes. The aircraft flown over North Africa and the Mediterranean varied 
immensely depending on their many diverse assignments. This section examines the 
technical features of the fighter aircraft from both sides involved in the North African 
campaign.    
The Royal Air Force faced a mixed matchup of machines above the desert. Not 
only did the Allies confront German aircraft, but also Italian and French warplanes. 
British fighter pilots overcame with little difficulty the German Stuka dive-bombers, the 
ME110 fighter-bombers, and the Italian air fleet, but the other German Messerschmitt 
fighters proved an entirely different matter. Germany used the battle-tested 
Messerschmitt BF-109, due to its nimbleness and speed. The twelve cylinders in the 
liquid-cooled engine produced 1,050 hp in 1939, and this increased to 1,475 hp by 1942. 
This engine allowed the fighter to scream through the sky at a top speed of 373 mph (600 
km/hr).6
                                                 
 
6 Enzo Angelucci and Paolo Matricardi. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft (Milan: 
Chartwell Books, 2001), 186.  
 The well-designed plane could bank and turn at impressive rates, making this 
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agile fighter a deadly foe. By the end of the war, the BF-109K model boasted 2,000 hp 
with a startling top speed of 452 mph (727 km/hr). One problem with the fighter was its 
inadequate fuel capacity. Consequently, it did not protect the bombers on their entire 
missions during the Battle of Britain. In North Africa, however, the Mediterranean target 
areas usually fell within the striking distance of Axis air stations. Messerschmitt modified 
the BF-109F to meet North African needs by adding a desert survival pack and a special 
filter to protect the air intake.7 It was armed with two 7.9 mm MG 17 machine-guns in 
the front nose cowling and one 20mm cannon that shot through a hole in the prop 
spinner.8
The German Focke Wulf 190A-1 excelled in speed and maneuverability even 
against the British Spitfire. Kurt Tank designed two variations of the plane in 1937 to 
fulfill the German air ministry’s request for a superior interceptor fighter.
 The German Luftwaffe also utilized a fighter designed by Focke Wulf, one even 
faster than the BF-109. 
9 He 
contemplated whether to use an inline engine or a powerful, yet bulky radial engine. 
After testing and modifying the two designs in order to find a propulsion system that 
would not overheat yet provide the maximum performance output, the radial engine was 
selected. The FW 190A-1 contained a fourteen cylinder BMW 801C-1 radial air-cooled 
engine that produced an output of 1,600 hp.10
                                                 
7 Martin Caidin, ME. 109 Willy Messerschmitt’s Peerless Fighter (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968), 
108. 
8 Angelucci, 186. 
9 Angelucci, 220. 
10 Angelucci, 186. 
 This massive engine gave the plane an 
impressive maximum speed of 389 mph (626 km/hr). These results tested a little faster 
than the second variation of the BF-109, which had a top speed of 373 mph (600 km/hr). 
For armament the FW 190 housed four cannon and two twenty- millimeter cannon spread 
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across its wings. Its fold-up landing gear needed to be extended to provide prop clearance 
from the massive engine cowling. This proved to be a minor setback, as the solution did 
not provide sufficient structure for the plane. Initially, the Luftwaffe suffered problems 
because these planes experienced rough landings, often damaging the landing gear and 
the plane, but modifications corrected this problem. The FW 190A-1’s limited range of 
497 miles (800 km) meant that it could not fully cover bombers on long missions. The 
BF-109 and the FW 190 were the Luftwaffe’s top fighters, while its BF-110 did not 
measure up to them.  
The Messerschmitt BF-110 was a two engine fighter-bomber with a crew of two 
or three. Originally, during the Battle of Britain, the plane’s moderately slow speed, 
despite its twin, Daimler-Benz, twelve cylinders, liquid-cooled engines which each 
provided 1,050hp, made it vulnerable to RAF fighters. The BF-110’s maximum 
operational range was stretched to 680 miles (1,094 km).11 The plane achieved a top 
speed of 336 mph (540 km/hr); its maneuverability compared unfavorably to that of the 
nimble single-seat fighters.12
                                                 
11 Angelucci, 86. 
12 Angelucci, 86. 
 The plane carried heavy armament, a total of five machine 
guns and two twenty-millimeter cannon. Its extensive weight was a liability. It conducted 
turns and maneuvers sluggishly when fully loaded with three crew members, fuel, and 
weaponry. Clearly, the plane’s weight severely limited its maneuverability. Luftwaffe 
pilots found the BF-110 ill-suited to fight against British Hurricanes and Spitfires; it 
proved disastrous in the Battle of Britain. When used in the desert, however, the BF-110 
fulfilled its original intent. It served different roles, as a reconnaissance and fighter 
bomber. This long range airplane was versatile and well-armed, suitable for missions 
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above the desert. Later renditions of the BF-110, equipped with night air detection 
equipment, made it a night fighter. Its double engines accommodated the added weight of 
the night fighting equipment, making the BF-110 a logical choice for this use.13
The Stuka dive-bomber became one of the most important parts of the Luftwaffe 
servicing Germany’s tactical warfare. The Stuka contributed precision, dive-bomb strikes 
on the battlefield. Attempting to strike fear into enemy forces, the aircraft’s wheel struts 
held spinners designed to shriek as the plane dived. In the weeks leading up to the Battle 
of El Alamein, Stukas flew around three hundred and sixty sorties. The Luftwaffe 
suffered from the dwindling number of Stuka planes available for use with Rommel’s 
desert ground units, as well as for the continued attack against Malta. The reasons for this 
included Allied fighter superiority and anti-aircraft defenses and an increasing shortage 
of German pilots, fuel, oil, and other materials, due to Allied air strikes.
 The role 
assigned to the plane made a big difference in its value and effectiveness. The Luftwaffe 
employed not only these long range planes, but also superb fighters and dive bombers to 
assist its troops on the ground. Along with its fighters, the Luftwaffe also used dive-
bombers in North Africa and the Mediterranean.   
14 The plane’s 
slow speed caused trouble when defending against enemy aircraft. Germany modified its 
Ju.87 Stuka, and, by 1941, produced the Ju.87D-1. The newer Stuka incorporated a few 
improvements. Its designers extended the Stuka’s operational range to 940 miles (1,535 
km), which vastly exceeded the 490 miles (788 km) range of the first variation.15
                                                 
13 Angelucci , 220. 
14  Warner Held and Ernst Obermaier. The Luftwaffe in the North African Campaign 1941-1943 (West 
Chester: Schiffer Military History, 1992) , 78. 
15 Angelucci, 137. 
 The 
Ju.87 D-1 Stuka’s 1,400 hp Junkers Jumo 211J-1 twelve cylinder, liquid-cooled engine 
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and its usual armament of up to 3,968 lbs (1,800 kg) of bombs meant that the plane could 
achieve a top speed of only 255 mph (410 km/hr).16
The Italian Regia Aeronautica fought the war on the Axis side from June 10, 
1940, to September 8, 1943. Many sources agree that the Regia Aeronautica’s assistance 
to the Germans’ campaign against Great Britain in the Battle of Britain and against the 
Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa was marginal. Italy’s campaigns in the 
Mediterranean and North Africa, however, did inflict damage on the Allies.
 Two aviators manned the Stuka, the 
pilot and the gunner. Without the advantage of speed and maneuverability, the Stuka, 
despite its four machine guns, was at great risk when encountering enemy fighters. These 
disadvantages rendered the Stuka highly vulnerable to Allied fighter aircraft. While the 
Stuka failed in the campaign over England, over the desert it could pinpoint targets for 
precision bombardment.  
Since the Spanish Civil War and the 1940 Battle of Britain, Germany’s air arsenal 
included modified, battle-tested air machines. These advanced planes of the Luftwaffe 
seemed ready and capable to undertake operations over the desert. The primary reason 
the Luftwaffe shifted its attention to the Mediterranean and North African Desert was to 
aid its struggling Axis partner, Italy, against the British. The Italians flew planes of their 
own against the British, machines quite different in design and performance. 
17
                                                 
16 Angelucci, 137. 
17 Giovanni Massimello and Giorgiao Apostolo. Italian Aces of World War 2 (London: Osprey Aviation, 
2000), 7.  
 The Italian 
aviation industry produced fighters which possessed only limited power. Due to 
inadequate availability of resources, Italy maintained a force of under-supplied and ill-
equipped planes. Italian technology, despite Il Duce’s efforts to turn fascist Italy into a 
modern world power, lagged far behind that of the world’s greatest powers; Italy as a 
 26 
nation faced a stark divide between its industrial North and undeveloped South. This 
geographic dichotomy plagued the uniformity of its air forces.18
The main Italian fighter aircraft companies, Macchi, Fiat, and Reggiane, 
manufactured monoplane fighter planes by 1941. The performance levels of these aircraft 
lagged behind those of British and German fighter planes. The Macchi C.200 Seatta, 
operational in the autumn of 1941, had a Fiat radial engine capable of 870 hp. It could 
accelerate to a top speed of 313 mph (503 km /hr.). 
  
19 Although this seems fast by 1930’s 
standards, a British Hawker Hurricane produced 1, 300 hp, with Rolls Royce engine 
capable of 329 mph (529 km /hr). Even more of a contrast, the Supermarine Spitfire had 
an engine output of 1,710 hp, with a top speed of over 408 mph, so the Italian fighter was 
out-matched in terms of speed. 20
In aerial combat, speed and engine power is everything, the force that drives 
evasive and aggressive maneuvers that decide life or death for a pilot. Italian planes were 
outmatched and outgunned, so their pilots needed to find creative ways to shoot down 
their technologically superior foes. Ingo Mario Castoldi designed the Macchi C.200 
Saetta (Lightning) as Italy expanded its military during the mid 1930’s African 
campaigns. Italy assigned one hundred and fifty-six C.200 Saettas to fly in the first 
operational assignment against Malta, during June of 1940.
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  The Caporoni-Reggiane 
was yet another fighter plane in Italy’s arsenal. Slightly faster than the C.200 Sertta, its 
1,175 hp, liquid- cooled twelve cylinder Daimler-Benz engine allowed it to reach a top 
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speed of 349 mph (563 km/hr).22 The Italians armed the Caporoni-Reggiane moderately 
with four machine guns, and the aircraft had an operational range of 684 miles (1,100 
km).23
As the British engaged the Germans and the Italians, a new, unexpected “Axis” 
force arose as the Americans began Operation TORCH - the Vichy French. After the 
collapse of the French Armée de l’Air, when Germany conquered France, the Vichy 
French Air Force survived in southern France and in the French North African colonies. 
The finest fighter the French possessed, the Dewoitine D.520, could outmaneuver the 
early model of the German BF-109 and match its speed. This well-armed French fighter 
had a twenty mm cannon situated in its propeller block and four machine guns in its 
wings; this decisively outgunned the American P-40.
 These planes were well built, but were not as fast or as heavily armed as modern 
war planes of other nations. However, their durability frequently allowed them to survive 
aerial combat. Many of them could withstand a considerable amount of battle damage 
and still return to their base. These Axis planes faced a mix of British planes. The British 
only had a limited supply of their best fighter, the Spitfire, so they utilized many desert-
modified Hawker Hurricanes. The British used many other outdated and varied type 
aircraft ranging from obsolete biplanes to torpedo bombers against their enemies in North 
Africa and the Mediterranean. 
24
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 Emile Dewoitine designed and 
privately manufactured the plane in 1936, but the military did not adopt it until 1938. The 
first prototype contained a flaw in its radiator. This caused serious overheating and 
prevented a favorable top speed. The French later modified the Dewoitine 520 prototype 
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allowed it to enter mass production by 1939.25 A 930 hp Hispano-Suiza engine powered 
the Dewoitine (D.520), enabling it to maintain a top speed of 326 mph (525 km/hr).26 
This single seat fighter plane boasted an impressive range of 605 miles (990 km), equal to 
a considerable stretch of shoreline aside the North African desert. Over three hundred 
D.520 aircraft survived the onslaught of the battle for France, and subsequently flew 
mostly in North Africa.27
 
 The French plane’s full potential was restricted during the war, 
since their manufacturers were either shut down by the Germans or maintained under 
German directives.  
The Axis fighters, along with the fighters flown by the Vichy French, were unique 
in their technological characteristics by nation. The Germans possessed aircraft that were 
generally superior to there of the British and American air forces. Out of all of the 
nations’ air forces, however, the British aircraft proved to be the most diverse, with 
capabilities of torpedo-bombing, interception, fighter-bombing, and strafing. Britain’s 
vast empire and its ordeal in the Battle of Britain caused it to develop and modify not 
only first-rate fighters, but also other aircraft. These played a vital role in the fight 
involving convoys in the Mediterranean. Although it seemed as if no nation could 
develop a fighter comparable to the German Messerschmitt BF-109, the British devised 
one that came close to being its equal, the Spitfire. The British took special care in 
developing its aircraft technology, so they ended up with more capable airplanes than the 
United States. Furthermore, the well developed aviation technology allowed the RAF to 
survive and develop strong tactics to succeed in the desert and over the Mediterranean.   
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Chapter 3 
Technology of the Allied Fighters 
 
The RAF by 1940 possessed both excellent fighters and heavy bombers. Fighter 
Command possessed two main fighter aircraft, the Hawker Hurricane and the 
Supermarine Spitfire. These RAF fighters achieved fame when they provided the margin 
of victory during the Battle of Britain. Sydney Camm designed the Hawker Hurricane in 
1935 as a single-seat monoplane fighter aircraft capable of a top speed of 300 mph (483 
km/h).28 The Hurricane flew only a moderate range, since it held sixty-six gallons in its 
two main fuel tanks with a reserve of twenty-eight gallons. This was greatly extended by 
the addition of a drop tank which increased its fuel load to two hundred and seventy-four 
gallons.29 The Hurricane consumed fuel at a rate of roughly 56 gallons/hr.30 Later models 
were driven by better engines. The Hurricane’s speed increased steeply to 336 mph (541 
km/h), with the addition of the Rolls-Royce, Merlin XX V-12 piston engine. The 
aircraft’s design accommodated outward retractable landing gear, quite different from 
those other planes of the era that retracted inwards.31
Unlike German fighters, whose armament was housed in the nose cowling, the 
Hurricane’s wings housed its guns. British factories equipped this plane with an 
 Its landing gear was built wide and 
stable to make the plane easier to land when it sustained heavy damage. Another 
difference from other nations’ planes included the location of the Hurricane’s guns. 
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impressive number of guns, which varied by model. The Hurricane Mk 1 carried eight 
7.7mm machine guns, while the later Mk IIB model boasted twelve, with six in each 
wing. In North Africa, the RAF adopted different weapons to suit their needs in the 
desert. The Hurricane Mk IID of the Desert Air Force had two 40mm anti-tank cannon, 
enabling it to attack ground targets.32
Commanders cautioned the pilots assigned to fly above the desert regarding the 
disadvantages of the Hawker Hurricane I in comparison to the BF-109. They said, “The 
Messerschmitt has nearly a hundred miles an hour on us in level flight.”
 The Hurricane had a limited range of 460 miles 
(740 km) confining it to a limited coverage area of operation. 
33 Spirits sank 
further, during a Desert Air Force briefing as the commander declared, “…and diving 
down on us from God knows what altitude, they’d have all the advantage. Forget your 
dreams of glory, Ed. Put on your red wig and your false nose and learn to be 
inconspicuous. Save your energy for running away. That’s our game, I’m afraid.”34
Evolved from the design of a high performance racing seaplane, the Spitfire 
proved to be a decisive addition to the Royal Air Force. Reginald Mitchell designed the 
 This 
applied to the Hawker Hurricane Mk I. Improved models followed, but the BF-109 still 
held a decisive advantage. Hurricanes, however, could easily overpower and destroy most 
Italian fighters, so they were assigned that role in the desert and the Mediterranean. The 
Hurricane was a classic, staple fighter for the RAF, which, however, needed a faster and 
more maneuverable plane to compete with the updated German BF-109. Their answer 
was the Supermarine Spitfire. 
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plane, beginning as a concept in 1933. Revised and refined many times, it became the 
sleek, elliptical wing fighter that finally entered service in 1938.35 The plane housed a 
powerful Rolls-Royce Merlin II twelve cylinder, liquid-cooled engine that generated 
1,030hp. The Spitfire Mark I clocked an impressive top speed of 355 mph (571 km/h), 
which improved in later models to 374 mph (602 km/h). By the end of the war, the 
Supermarine Spitfire Mk XIV raced through the skies at 448 mph (721 km/h). 36
Elsewhere, Britain employed a mix of fighters, often outdated, in the 
Mediterranean and North Africa.  The Boulton Paul Defiant Mk I proved an absolute 
disaster during the Battle of Britain. Its slow speed proved detrimental, as did the rear-
facing of all of its four machine guns. The aircraft design had the pilot flying the plane 
and a gunner in a back-facing turret. This turned out to be a terrible arrangement; when 
casualties mounted, the RAF learned the necessity of forward facing guns. The plane did 
have limited uses in the desert, but remained vulnerable. The twin-engine Bristol 
Beaufort existed as the RAF’s standard torpedo bomber. It contained a crew of four and 
flew at a top speed of 265 mph (426 km/h).
 Like the 
Hurricane, it carried its guns in its wings. The Spitfire Mk I sported eight machine guns, 
while the later model Spitfire Mk VB and all later versions were armed with four 
machine guns and two twenty mm cannon. Most pilots favored the Spitfire over other 
RAF fighter aircraft because it excelled in speed, maneuverability, and visibility.  
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 First introduced in 1938, the plane was 
effective against enemy shipping. Gun turrets in the nose and rear of the plane protected 
it from enemy fighters. Beauforts, stationed on Malta in early 1942, attacked Axis 
shipping bound for North Africa. Bristol manufactured another torpedo plane, the 
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Beaufighter. This was a duel-engine plane with a crew of two, used by the RAF to attack 
naval targets in the Mediterranean. It was relatively slow compared to other fighters, with 
a top speed of 321 mph (516 km/h). Nevertheless, the Beaufighter became the preferred 
choice for anti-shipping attacks, since it was faster than the Beaufort. The Beaufighter 
demonstrated a workhorse capability and attacked ships effectively with its 2,127 lb (964 
kg) torpedo.38 This plane could also be fitted with eight, under-wing unguided rockets. 
The Gloster Gladiator also performed as a torpedo bomber. An obsolete biplane dating 
from 1937, the Gladiator had a Bristol Mercury, nine-cylinder, radial, air-cooled eight 
hundred forty hp engine as its power plant. The plane was dangerously slow, for it could 
only fly, at best, 253 mph (407 km/hr).39
The United States military’s fighter units fell far behind British and German 
military aviation at the breakout of World War II. America lacked experienced pilots and 
 These planes did play a large role at Malta. The 
Royal Air Force, equipped with high performance fighters, coastal torpedo fighters, and a 
separate bomber command complete with heavy bombers, provided a comprehensive 
aerial arsenal. The RAF utilized its diverse planes above the sea and desert. 
 Britain had an air fleet of varied fighters suited for air war of the early 1940’s. 
America’s fighter aircraft early in World War II proved unsuitable. The British perfected 
their planes to meet the challenges of the desert war. The British equipped the majority of 
their air fighter units with Hurricanes and Spitfires. Although the RAF flew some 
outdated aircraft, these were used ways that best utilized their strengths. The RAF’s 
skillful and courageous pilots flew older planes to carry out torpedo strikes. Experienced 
pilots were necessary for success in this role.   
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advanced fighter planes. American fighters couldn’t compete with the Luftwaffe’s BF 
109s. The famed, North American P-51 Mustang was in its infancy as a planned aircraft 
and did not mature in use to its superior status until later. Nor did the Army Air Corps fly 
the P-47 Thunderbolt at this time. In its air arsenal in 1939, America had the Curtiss P-
36C and the Seversky P-35. The P-36 could barely maintain its top speed of over 300 
mph, clocking out at 311 mph (500 km/hr). The P-36’s inaccurate guns were practically 
useless since the plane could never fly to within range of the faster, well-armed enemy 
planes piloted by veteran pilots.40
By the time America entered the war, it had improved its attack aircraft. Its 
mainstay fighter was the Curtis P-40 Warhawk, a direct development from the Curtis P-
36 Hawk, with many improvements. Some of these included a re-worked landing gear, a 
thirty-caliber machine gun, and a carburetor with an added air-intake scoop.
   
41 Its 
armament of one machine gun on each wing proved completely inadequate compared to 
the heavily-armed fighters the rest of the rest of the world employed. Even Italian fighters 
sported more firepower than the early P-40 Warhawk model. The P-40CU, the first 
Warhawk model, had a maximum speed of 357 mph, completely deficient compared to 
the Luftwaffe fighter.42
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 This American plane’s speed came from an Allison V1710-33 
engine with an output of 1,090 horsepower. This first Warhawk variation lagged far 
behind the high standards of combat aircraft set by the Germans and the British. By 
March of 1941, the P-40C, also known as the Tomahawk IIB by the British, incorporated 
superior armament, but due to its added weight, flew slower than its preceding model. 
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The P-40C could achieve a top speed of only 345 mph.43The added machine guns were a 
step in the right direction; it now housed two fifty-caliber machine guns in the nose with 
four additional thirty caliber machine guns mounted in the wings. With this, the 
Warhawk contained at least the firepower to compete with Axis planes. In 1941, delivery 
of these new Tomahawks to the British made it possible for their use in North Africa to 
fight against the Vichy French, Italian, and the Germans. The British added armament to 
the plane to attack ground targets in the desert. The RAF quickly assigned the Tomahawk 
fighters to ground attack missions. America built eight hundred and twenty-eight 
Tomahawk IIB fighter planes and sent six hundred seventy-nine to the British and the rest 
to aid Russia and China.44
By the time of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the American engine 
manufacturer Alison developed a more effective redesigned engine block for the P-40 
that slightly increased its horsepower output from 1,090 to 1,150.
 As time progressed, many modifications were made on those 
American planes. 
45
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 The P-40E models 
used an Alison engine. Despite the more powerful engine, the plane went from 
satisfactory to worse. The designers removed the two cowling machine guns to allow 
room for the larger size of the engine block. This decreased firepower severely reduced 
its utility as a fighter aircraft. The British renamed the plane the Kittyhawk due to its 
extremely different design. Allison may have produced the best fighter engine produced 
in America, but the British Rolls-Royce Merlin engine outperformed it since the Allison 
experienced trouble performing at high altitudes. The British Merlin engine had a two-
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staged supercharger, generating an output of 1,300 horsepower.46 The British outfitted 
the P-40F with their Merlin engine, and this was the model American pilots flew in the 
TORCH invasion. The manufacturer fitted the P-40F with six fifty caliber machine guns, 
and the aircraft flew at a top speed of 364 mph.47
 Although not a fighter, the Piper L-4 Grasshopper, considered a great asset to the 
Army Air Corps, flew as an aerial observer for artillery. The plane itself was a flimsy, 
underpowered, unarmed deathtrap. The Army Air Corps soon discovered that using the 
L-4 Grasshopper with its miniscule engine was a lethal mistake. A 65 hp, Continental O-
170 four-cylinder engine with a maximum speed of 85 mph (137 km/hr) powered the 
plane.
As this aircraft still did not reach the 
standards of the top foreign fighter aircraft, American fighter pilots were at a 
disadvantage when they first saw action. 
48 The plane flew so slowly that it could not outrun enemy aircraft, and this allowed 
for extended enemy exposure due to the increased time to arrive at a destination. Its range 
was only 190 miles (304 km). Its civilian equivalent, the Piper Cub, remains a popular 
plane in civil aviation today. Two major differences between the American Air Corps’ 
idea of aerial reconnaissance and the British were the horsepower and type of aircraft. 
The British understood the vulnerability of reconnaissance aircraft. They used for 
reconnaissance flights a modified Hawker Hurricane fitted with a camera and 1,030 hp to 
allow for escape from threatening enemy fighters.49 It had a range of 460 miles (740 km) 
and was much better suited for covering ground than the American L-4 Grasshopper.50
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 In Operation TORCH, the Army Air Corps was not the only American source of 
air power. The U.S. Navy played a large role in the operation and used the Grumman 
F4F-4 Wildcat. The Wildcat took off from and landed on the deck of a carrier. By design, 
it landed with the aid of a tail hook that caught the arresting cables on the carrier deck in 
order to stop the plane. Manufacturers installed Pratt & Whitney R830-86 twin Wasp 
radial engines that sported fourteen cylinders into the plane. The Wildcat’s air-cooled 
engine produced 1,200 horsepower, allowing the plane to achieve a top speed of 318 
mph, slow by fighter standards.51 The plane looked tubby and awkward with its large 
radial engine and fat elongated fuselage. The landing gear retracted into the sides of the 
fuselage. The Wildcat’s armament included six machine guns, and the plane achieved a 
flight range of 770 miles (1,240 km). The pilots considered the Wildcat’s weaponry one 
of its best features.52 Based on design and performance, however, the plane proved to be 
ill-matched against the enemy fighters it soon faced. However, Wildcats played an 
integral role in the assault on Casablanca and other areas during Operation TORCH. 
America was in the process of building other more advanced planes for its arsenal, but 
these were not available in time for the North African landings.53
Most of the aircraft used during Operation TORCH were inferior to German and 
British fighters with the exception of the twin-engine P-38 Lightning fighter, which was 
used in some of the later landings of Operation TORCH and in the ensuing North African 
campaign.
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 This American fighter had an unconventional design. The Lockheed P-38 
54 One of the advanced fighters under construction was the North American P-51A Mustang used an Alison 
twelve cylinder, liquid-cooled engine with an output of 1,200 hp. This engine was later replaced with the 
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Lightning possessed a twin-engine, was twin-boomed, a single seat fighter capable of a 
top speed of 414 mph (667 km/h). Two 1,475hp, Alison V-1710-111, liquid-cooled 
engines propelled the plane to its comparatively fast speed.55 The P-38 Lightning had 
both positive and negative attributes, as did other fighters. According to Lightning pilot 
C.L. “Kelly” Johnson, the Lightning was a well balanced fighter; he listed fifteen positive 
points and fifteen negative points.56 The guns, stacked and centered in the nose cone, 
packed a heavy punch. The tires possessed an adequate size diameter and they showed a 
configuration in a well-balanced tricycle gear layout. This pattern, according to the 
maintenance manuals, lent itself to easy removal and replacement. The brake system, 
which on other aircraft was quite difficult to replace, was simple to remove on the 
Lightning due to its innovative design. Since the plane sat high, the maintenance crew 
easily marked and determined slippage. The tall struts allowed a mechanic to duck under 
and get a good look. This allowed for easy maintenance of the aircraft.57
When describing the plane’s assets, the P-38 pilots said that the plane contained a 
lot of power with its dual, supercharged engines, low basic drag, and great 
maneuverability. The Lightning’s favorable slipstream effect also made it a delight to 
 All of these 
features helped the plane’s performance. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Packard 12 cylinder engine with 1,400 hp and later, 1,510 hp to increase the P-51D model of the Mustang 
to a top speed of 437 mph (703 km/hr).54 The “D” model was an improvement created from the previous 
models.  The manufacturer’s engineers achieved this development by examining flight results during early 
campaigns. Another innovation the Americans added to the “D” model was a bubble canopy to provide 
superb pilot visibility and an increased range of 950 miles (1,530 km). The extended mileage allowed the 
plane to be one of the few fighters in the war possessing the capability to cover the bombers all the way to 
the target.54 The “D” model did not arrive until later in the war. On the Navy side, the F4F Wildcat was 
replaced by the F6F Hellcat in 1943. The Hellcat outperformed the Wildcat in almost every way. It was 
carrier borne and served as a fighter mostly in the Pacific later in the war. These fighters did not see action 
during operation TORCH. 
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fly.58 This, of course, depended on the engine working properly. On the opposite side of 
the spectrum, the Lockheed P-38 Lightning encountered various engine problems, 
including backfiring, cooling, and solid fuel flow problems. There were also problems of 
comfort for the pilot, such as insufficient cockpit heat and a dangerous tail construction 
when the pilot bailed out.59
Having outlined the characteristics of the fighter aircraft used during the air war, I 
briefly describe the equipment used by the pilots; regardless of the aircraft they were 
assigned. Standard equipment for pilots of this era included six major components that 
made up the flight gear. These included, but were not limited to: helmet, goggles, fire 
resistant gloves, boots, parachute, and a “Mae West” (life preserver). Additional items 
included an oxygen-connecting hose, a mouthpiece and radio.
 However, the cockpit, itself, was quite spacious by World 
War II standards. The complexities of the P-38 Lightning presented a problem for the 
novice pilots tasked to fly them in the limited missions assigned to the planes in the later 
stage of Operation TORCH.  
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 The “Mae West” was 
especially important when flying over bodies of water, such as the Mediterranean. The 
pilots utilized charts for navigation. This set of gear, when teamed up with a fueled and 
ammunition loaded plane, made air combat possible. Strapped into his seat and wearing 
his equipment, the pilot required full access to the flight controls. British programs 
trained their men to become proficient airmen. It took a well trained pilot to understand 
how to incorporate twists and maneuvers in order to capitalize on an enemy’s mistake. 
The hardware only allowed the platform and tools for combat as it took a skilled and 
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determined pilot to manipulate the controls and transform the airplane into a weapon. 
These complex maneuvers and pilot instincts played a major role in outsmarting their 
opponent. This could only be learned from experience. American cadets’ lack of 
exposure and lackluster training in the appropriate aircraft decreased their combat 
effectiveness and put them at great risk. American pilots received fewer opportunities to 
practice using their equipment in flight training than did the British, since they spent so 
little time in their combat aircraft. 
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Chapter 4 
Britain’s Aviation Training Process 
 
The performance deficiencies so evident among American pilots during Operation 
TORCH revealed, to a significant extent, the flaws of their training in military aviation. 
America’s military flight training program in 1942 contained an overburdened and 
flawed protocol. Many new pilots went through the program without learning essential 
skills. Corresponding training programs for RAF pilots were more thorough and allowed 
for more flight time and a more comprehensive approach to the application of combat 
flight skills and knowledge.  
A comparison between the course training materials of the two nations is 
astonishing, for the cadets of the RAF received far more detailed and in depth curriculum 
covering several mathematical methods and applications of advanced navigation, weather 
observation, and practical flight maneuvers than did their American counterparts. British 
publications authored by aviation navigation experts such as David Hay Surgeoner and 
mathematical pilot applications devised by A.F Buchan and R. Borthwick provided the 
British with exceptional standardized training materials. With effective hands on flight 
curriculum backed by excellent standardized texts, RAF cadets received outstanding 
instruction regardless of their RAF school locations. The majority of British cadets either 
learned to fly in Britain itself or was outsourced to replica schools established in Canada. 
Accustomed to assembling and preparing aircrew of different nationalities, the British 
used the same standardized training curriculum to train its pilots from all over Great 
Britain and its empire as well as fellow foreign Europeans. The RAF system offered 
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opportunities for new pilots to gain combat experience under the supervision of training 
supervisors who were themselves veterans of air combat. This practice infused battle 
proven techniques onto the new pilots. They gained further preparedness for the air war 
by experiencing actual combat missions during training. At the same time, the RAF 
avoided exposing these new pilots to high-risk operations. Veteran instructors 
accompanied trainees on relatively safe combat assignments. This practice was quite 
common. Geoffrey Moyer recalled that his training unit flew actual missions with novice 
Australian and South African pilots.61
  Flying an aircraft is a complex activity that requires great skill, knowledge, and 
experience. Fighter pilots must know how to successfully and safely fly their aircraft, 
navigate accurately in all weather conditions, and utilize a working knowledge of air 
combat in order to fight and survive in the war. The American pilot training program 
often failed to teach its pilots rudimentary but necessary flying skills, such as landing and 
navigation. These deficiencies surfaced when American pilots failed to perform correct 
landing procedures often crashing during their initial combat missions, including sorties 
flown in Operation TORCH. Inexperience and lack of knowledge was the primary causal 
 This method taught trainees the fundamentals of 
aerial combat by providing minimal exposure to actual live fire and real threats. 
Frequently, these experiences instilled bravery, as well as confidence, in the airmen and 
sharpened their mastery of aerial combat maneuvers. These qualities were difficult to 
produce in classrooms alone. Trainees copied the actions of their veteran trainers. The 
instructors not only looked after them, but also taught them how to complete their 
missions safely. American pilots who trained in 1942 lacked this valuable experience, 
since they had not flown on actual combat missions.   
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factor of most of these accidents. The American air elements suffered from a flawed 
fighter pilot instruction system, while the RAF benefited from its own superior teaching 
methods.  
The British developed, by 1942, a high quality, standard combat pilot educational 
system that, when combined with actual combat experience, produced superb pilots. They 
established many training schools in Canada, as well as in Britain. The program 
contained different levels to ensure that pilots mastered the mechanics of flying their 
aircraft in both favorable and unfavorable weather conditions. From there, students 
moved forward learning aerial maneuvers and combat tactics. Future RAF fighter pilots 
started in the Initial Training Wing (ITW). During this period, ITW pilots learned 
fundamentals of map reading, navigation, meteorology, airmanship, and aircraft 
recognition.62 Textbook manuals favored in 1942 for these British trainees included 
David Hay Surgeoner’s First Principles of Flight, 1941 and Air Training Series 
Navigation and Meteorology.63  The latter focused heavily on skills of map reading and 
calculations of position fixing to instruct a new pilot in navigation.64
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 It was important for 
the cadets to master these vital skills, because they focused on circumstances which could 
cause accidents in combat. The American training schools failed to properly teach these 
important skills. Aircraft recognition was important, for it prevented pilots from shooting 
down friendly aircraft. Map reading and navigation proved essential, especially over the 
desert and water where landmarks were scarce. This forced a pilot to rely on his 
navigational skills by utilizing time, compass headings, and maps to determine his 
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position.65 At the ITW, British pilots not only learned these skills, but mastered them to a 
point to where they could be effective in combat. Cadet graduates testified that they were 
ahead of the curve thanks to the preparation provided by the ITW and seemed better 
prepared than their American counterparts, who lacked such an effective initial training 
phase.66
From the ITW, the trainees moved on to the Elementary Flying Training School 
(EFTS). At the EFTS, they flew often to acquire the fundamentals, gaining flight 
exposure in all weather conditions and other situations. By intent, these maneuvers 
demanded proficiency from the new pilots while flying their aircraft. To prevent friendly 
fire, RAF cadets needed to pass an exam on aircraft recognition. It was vitally important 
to recognize and recall the wing span of both friendly and enemy aircraft.
  
67 After the 
EFTS, they moved to the Service Flight Training School (SFTS). The SFTS typically 
lasted two and a half months, a period when new pilots flew first the Tiger Moth then the 
Hawker Hurricane. The standard text for British instructors was the Air Publication 
1732b, a standardized manual for instructors at the SFTS schools. It outlined step by step 
methods for instructors to teach maneuvers and aerial gunnery.68
The Tiger Moth, the primary aircraft used in the SFTS before pilots moved on to 
the Hurricane or Spitfire, contained a relatively simplistic instrument panel with a dozen 
gauges. Tiger Moths were the light aircraft used by the British and the Canadians for their 
initial training. The Canadian Air Force, like the British, utilized constant flight training 
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throughout the program and simultaneous ground courses. The Museum of Flight 
graciously allowed me access to a rare, limited edition copy of David J. Carter’s 
exhaustedly detailed work, entitled Prairie Wings. His book traced the historical 
background of the established RAF bases in Canada formulated by the ‘”secret” diary of 
personal stationed at Alberta’s Medicine Hat Air Base. It described the process of 
training both British and Canadian fighter pilots. With a follow up visit to the Langley 
airfield in British Columbia, I examined flyable, refurbished Tiger Moths. Based on 
knowledge gathered from viewing the aircraft and its specifications, along with the 
diaries included in Carter’s book, I learned that flying these planes and imitating combat 
maneuvers occurred early in the training process. Their American counterparts, in 
contrast, studied books and learned straight and level flight. 69
British SFTS trainees also benefited from flying the actual aircraft they would use 
in combat after mastering the Tiger Moth, accumulating flight hours in either a Hurricane 
or Spitfire.
  
70
In combat, the British cadet pilot usually flew the Hurricane or Spitfire. When 
RAF cadets flew these aircraft, they faced half a hundred controls and instruments.
 The Tiger Moth’s speed and characteristics allowed the RAF cadets to 
master technique before moving on. The combination of flying this particular aircraft 
with their initial training in their assigned fighter made a significant difference for the air 
trainees, since the trainees were exposed to their eventual combat plane and flying it 
familiarized themselves with its unique speed and handling.  
71
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After RAF trainees graduated from the SFTS, the final hurdle before going to war 
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consisted of operations training, which taught and perfected their air combat abilities.72
The British extended their training system to other areas within the 
Commonwealth and Empire. The RAF sent many of their British pilots to Canada for 
training, due to Canada’s vast spaces, extra resources and abundance of training aircraft 
suitable for effective use.
 
These multi-tiered levels of the British pilot training system ensured that its graduates 
became well versed and ready for aerial combat. The system worked, and RAF pilots not 
only employed a great number of useful skills during combat, but were also trained to 
minimize accidents. 
73  England with its insular confines lacked the space required 
for the scale of training needed.74 Instructors, using planes like the Tiger Moth, taught 
both British and Canadian cadets by employing the effective training structure the RAF 
used in the British Isles. One exceptional difference between the Royal Canadian Air 
Force (RCAF) and the RAF was that the latter kept its pilots’ accomplishments 
anonymous, while the Canadians published the names of their pilots.75
British cadet flight time was much more frequent compared to their American 
counterparts.
  
76 British and the Americans did share a common training aircraft referred 
by the RAF as the North American AT-6 Harvard, a plane also known as the Texan.77
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The Harvard, an American-made training aircraft, situated the pilot in the rear of the 
aircraft. This differed from the front seat arrangement in the lighter Tiger Moth. These 
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planes provided British pilots with the platform to quickly master the basics so that they 
could move on to fly the actual combat aircraft. Their proper training on these machines 
minimized training accidents even though accidents did occur. In Langley, British 
Columbia, Canada, I was able to examine at the Canadian Museum of Flight the actual 
training aircraft like the AT-6 Harvard restored to flying condition. Painted yellow in 
order to serve as trainers so that the instructors and ground observers could spot them 
from the ground the new pilots spent many hours learning combat maneuvers in these 
aircraft. 
According to Carter’s research, only sixteen members of the aircrew died due to 
accidents on or near the Swift Current training bases situated in Saskatchewan, Canada. 
This number is relatively low, and adverse weather conditions and failed landings caused 
most of the incidents.78 The Canadian-based schools effectively produced knowledgeable 
pilots who could perform well in combat. The first forty-eight fighter squadrons 
graduated from the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) schools managed thirty-one kills 
in the Battle of Britain with only sixteen combat related losses.79
 In contrast, American pilots spent most of their time flying under-powered 
training aircraft and less of it in actual combat aircraft. The amount of time spent in a 
combat aircraft contributed a great deal to the learning process. Normally, pilots 
 Even though this was 
only a 0.6 kill ratio per squadron, their achievements built up the new pilots’ experience. 
This track record, compared to the disastrous performance of American airmen, shows 
that the British and British Canadian air schools produced much more effective 
personnel. 
                                                 
78 Carter, 187. 
79 Carter 178.  
 47 
improved their abilities by accumulating flight experience through repetition and logging 
flight hours in their aircraft. A pilot arguably required more practice time in the combat 
plane than he needed in the trainer to obtain proficiency for basic certification. When 
American pilots graduated from their trainer aircraft to combat planes, they found it 
necessary to relearn everything according to the specifications of the new aircraft. Pilots 
needed to adjust to the difference in power, speed, and handling of new planes. British-
trained pilots had made this shift much earlier, which gave them an advantage. The 
American training program differed greatly from the British program and failed to deliver 
skills, knowledge, and experience necessary for new pilots to survive in combat. 
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Chapter 5 
Insufficient American Training 
 
On paper, the American training system appeared to indicate the skills needed for 
a combat pilot. In actuality, it contributed to many accidents due to its flawed structure, 
one that prohibited pilots from gaining enough knowledge and experience to be proficient 
in flying complex combat aircraft. According to the official guide to the Army Air 
Forces, AAF, a pilot’s duties included the following: “(a pilot) handles controls of plane 
and commands aircraft; in addition, fighter pilot fires guns, navigates, communicates with 
radio, sometimes directs and releases bombs.”80 However, these skills were secondary 
within the American structured pilot training, as America focused more on producing a 
greater quantity of pilots, while sacrificing their quality. The official guide to the AAF 
even admitted that, in 1941, the AAF Flying Training Command was small, outdated, 
scattered, and loosely coordinated.81
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 In 1942, it was split into two commands: the Flying 
Training Command and the Technical Command. The British employed a more effective 
regimental, three- tiered system. The Americans had a similar breakdown of different 
levels, but their requirements were less skill-based, specific, or uniform than the RAF’s 
programs. First, the American cadets learned the technical skills of flying. After 
perfecting these skills, further training allowed them to fly combat aircraft. The cadets 
spent more time on the technical and academic aspect of air combat than actually 
practicing and perfecting their skills. 
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The Army Air Force Pilot training process contained five levels of achievements. 
First, cadet pilots attended a ten week course of preflight school studying physics, math, 
and plane recognition.82 To the British, this was time wasted. The RAF instructors used 
preliminary training time to instill more practical knowledge of matters, such as 
navigation and weather.83 The British learned math, but only as it applied directly to 
navigation and fuel consumption.84 British texts on mathematics and navigation by David 
Hay Surgeoner integrated their content to specific functions needed for aerial combat.85 
The British felt that knowledge of weather and navigation trumped the importance of 
knowledge of physics for a new pilot. Unlike Surgeoner’s text, the American navigational 
text approached navigation mathematically and lacked practical examples of applying the 
navigational methods to actual sorties. The US FM 1-30 Air Corps Manual on Air 
Navigation approached navigation with esoteric mathematical definitions and diagrams in 
a condensed theoretical approach for determining position from bearings.86 Thirty pages 
were spent in the American navigational field manual on definitions, diagrams, formulas 
and vague steps compared to a fleshed out British full text that included skill application 
scenarios, practical navigational procedures, and several navigational aid options which 
could be combined for better results.87
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 The American field manual failed to prepare US 
pilots to navigate the desolate coast of Morocco in 1942, whereas the British navigational 
text instructed aircrew to adapt to their environment by taking bearing on landmarks, 
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dead reckoning, and other practically applied navigational methods taught by Surgeoner. 
By lessening focus on applied navigation, the American training programs contributed to 
accidents during the early days of TORCH.  
After the preliminary stage, American cadets entered Primary Flying School, 
which also lasted ten weeks. Here, they spent seventy-five hours in underpowered, 
outdated biplanes attempting to learn the fundamentals of flying. Acquiring proficiency 
to fly a biplane was much easier than learning to pilot a combat monoplane capable of 
flying over 300 mph. Under the American training system, school work and military 
physical training on the ground supplemented the biplane flight exercises. Curiously, 
pilots received physical training equivalent to that given to ground troops when their role 
did not involve the same physical effort demanded for infantry. Time spent drilling 
maneuvers could have been better spent practicing control manipulation and air 
maneuvers.  
   After completing primary flight school, the future pilots entered Basic Flight 
School. This level, like all others in the American training program, lasted ten weeks. At 
this stage, trainees spent seventy hours flying faster planes with 450 horsepower engines. 
These new planes were much faster than the 125 horsepower biplanes previously flown, 
but still vastly underpowered compared to the aircraft the new pilots would fly in combat. 
Much of this training continued on the ground; the trainees devoted forty-seven hours of 
their time to military drill and devoted ninety-four hours to ground school.88 Academic 
work and military drill comprised two-thirds of the entire American training program, 
leaving only a third of it available for flight experience.89
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 The American training system 
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lacked a central focus on flying, whereas, in the British system, flight training was the 
principal emphasis.   
As documented above, the American training system failed to provide sufficient 
experience in the air. American trainees received far less exposure to their fighter planes 
than their RAF counterparts. This was a major problem, because training on such aircraft 
was a vital part of producing proficient aircrew. Additionally, American flight training 
programs were overcrowded with students in 1940-1942; this decreased the effectiveness 
of their instructors.90 The number of student pilots increased so quickly that the 
established training institution struggled to accommodate them. In 1939, the United 
States government set a goal of producing 1,200 military pilots a year. This number 
jumped to 7,000 in 1940, and further to 30,000 in February of 1941.91 Since only a 
limited number of trained instructors and administrators were available, this steep 
increase made adequate instruction difficult. To meet the demand, new facilities were 
necessary in order to accommodate these large numbers. The time spent constructing new 
establishments and expanding old schools hindered the escalating American training 
programs. Planes needed to be stored and taxied around the makeshift, often temporary, 
structures used as training facilities.92
As mentioned earlier, many hours of flight training in the American program took 
place on the ground, in aircraft simulators. The Link Trainer was a mechanical box in 
which the pilot sat and learned to fly by operating the gauges swiveling on gyros.
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extremely primitive simulators gave a student pilot practice only with instrumentation. 
The machines had a limited axis of movement, which prevented the cadet from practicing 
complex combat maneuvers, allowing only for aspects of basic flight.94 Since no 
projection of a simulated reality appeared, the pilot blindly moved the controls and 
speculated his imaginary attitude and position by both the gauge indicators and the 
limited movement of the box.95 The Link originated in the late 1930’s and, after many 
modifications, became the ANT-18 model. This machine simulated the North American 
AT-6. For the first time, a simulator trainer had the characteristics and personality of a 
specific aircraft programmed into the electronics.96
As mentioned earlier, when the cadet moved on to Advanced Flying Training, 
flying occupied only seventy hours out of the ten week training schedule. The trainees 
flew six hundred horsepower, single engine AT-6s. This compared unfavorably to enemy 
fighters which generated over 1,000 horsepower.
  
97 While the British and the Canadians 
also used the AT-6, they did so much earlier in the training process.98 Equipment for 
advanced navigation used such as directional gyro were important and taught briefly in 
the Pilots Manual and in alternative publication in 1940, intended for training civilian 
pilots but also adopted for fighter pilot hopefuls.99
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 Furthermore, when the American 
pilots graduated from Advanced Flying Training, little time remained for them to adapt to 
their new aircraft. The program allotted AFT graduates ten hours to fly their actual 
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combat aircraft within a five week transitional period.100
Accidents were so frequent during the American pilot training process that the 
Regional Safety Organization (RSO) launched a campaign of safety awareness and 
improvement. The RSO began this campaign through posters with visual warnings 
depicting accident cases. One such poster featured an airplane tail sticking out of a 
wrecked house with a caption noting, “A very hot pilot? A very hot pilot was Henry 
Hightowers who boasted of having three hundred hours. To prove this claim, he dove on 
his girl’s house one day and crashed. They would have been married the fifteenth of 
May.”
 Only then did the new pilots fire 
the aircraft’s guns. The American Army Air Corps grouped into fighter teams flying 
either P-40s or P-38s. Their time spent on the ground reduced potential flight time, which 
was insufficient for war beyond acquiring a basic familiarity of aircraft handling. Much 
more time was necessary then allotted to improve performance and familiarity of 
complex aerial maneuvers. Due to this, the potential for air accidents increased.  
101 Interestingly, accidents such as these continued to occur, caused by 
hotheadedness or cocky attitudes. Other captions on other safety awareness posters were 
closer to reality: they depicted emotional pilots unable to complete maneuvers. A hole in 
the ground by the airport hangers is labeled with “The stupid droop, gander my lads at the 
stupid droop, who knew he could manage an outside loop; halfway around it he crumpled 
a wing and muffed his yank on the ripcord ring.”102
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 Such mishaps continued in combat 
when ill-trained American pilots conducted flight missions over North Africa. During the 
opening days of Operation TORCH, inexperienced American fliers ended up suffering 
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higher non-combat losses than the number of them shot down by enemy actions. The 
American Air Corps considered accidents a normal part of life at the Falcon training 
base. Thirty fatalities resulted from aviation accidents at Falcon.103 The RSO recognized 
that the quick growth of the program impaired its ability to adequately train pilots. This 
also increased the incidence of training accidents. Such statistics should have raised 
concerns, as the number of American military airplane pilot deaths increased by three 
hundred and fifteen percent during 1942.104
American pilots experienced more landing mishaps as well as mid-air collisions 
and failures to execute maneuvers correctly than did their British counterparts.
   
105 Seventy 
percent of the British fatalities occurred when their pilots attempted to land.106 
Nonetheless, an unorthodox landing was a rare sight, for example, for the Southern 
Rhodesian cadets enrolled in British standardized training format. One did occur when 
two Tiger Moths collided during a training landing on May 14, 1942. The pilots executed 
the right technique, but failed to allow for the cross wind.  Thanks to the safety and 
thoroughness of British training, only one of the four airmen involved experienced 
injuries.107
Realizing that the American Air Corps experienced so many problems due to 
aircraft accidents in pilot training, the British feared that the Americans would perform 
poorly in combat, possibly to the point of becoming a liability to the Allied forces. Would 
American pilots learn from the many mistakes they had made in training, or would the act 
of sending accident-prone, under-trained pilots into combat lead inexorably to disasters in 
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combat? The British knew that the Luftwaffe was a powerful foe. During earlier battles, 
RAF pilots discovered tactics that allowed them to compete with faster and more 
maneuverable German planes. Could American pilots with no combat experience and 
poor training records become combat effective? The RAF needed more planes and pilots 
to combat the Axis. Lend Lease alone was not enough to defeat Germany. After Pearl 
Harbor, America was mobilizing for war and, one way or another, Great Britain sought to 
utilize its gigantic ally’s manpower, planes, and supplies. America had to quickly adapt 
its methods and acquire experience in order to fight alongside the British. One of the 
most difficult problems Great Britain and America faced was how to transmit British air 
tactics acquired through combat to the Americans.  
Operation TORCH involved the United States Army Air Force. This meant that 
underpowered and outclassed American built planes and inexperienced American pilots 
would fight in North Africa. The result shared much similarity to the difficulties the 
amphibious ground forces experienced, as Rick Atkinson recounted in his work, An Army 
at Dawn.  Low standards for both American pilots and ground forces presented a problem 
when their units needed to be integrated with British troops and fighter squadrons which 
were much better trained. These low standards presented an even bigger internal problem 
as many accidents resulted. This is not an aberration in the history of American military 
history, which had a long legacy of using poorly trained militia or soldiers in combat. The 
American tradition was the exact opposite of the British long-standing policy of keeping 
well-trained professional soldiers. The ideology of using a militia of loosely-trained 
ordinary citizens driven to volunteer to defend the nation continued into World War II. 
The concepts and technology of World War II were new, for no significant American 
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record existed of naval aviation before World War II. The United States hadn’t used 
carriers in combat prior to World War II, and the American military was still 
experimenting with this new technology.  
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Chapter 6 
Air Tactics: The Competing Methods of Air Combat 
 
Knowledge of dog-fighting tactics prepared a pilot to destroy enemy aircraft and 
survive aerial combat. British pilots acquired modified tactics of aerial warfare through 
the dogfights they fought during the Battle of Britain. Pilots discovered new fighting 
methods: tricks such as approaching enemies out of the sun to catch them by surprise, 
swooping in from above to maximize speed, and utilizing sharp banks and loops to evade 
an attacker.108
The original Royal Air Force Flying Training Manual, issued in 1939 to RAF 
pilots in its revised form, updated the fundamentals of air combat tactics, illustrated and 
explained a series of maneuvers. These included, but were not limited to, the barrel, 
continuous, climbing, gliding, flick, the upward rolls the cartwheel, the flick turn, and the 
falling leaf exercise.
 RAF pilots frequently used deflection shooting and with great success. 
This tactic coordinated shooting at an enemy in relation to the speed and angle of the 
shot. Another shooting skill included leading the target, which involved the distance the 
enemy traveled before the bullets reached his plane. The shooter aimed and fired ahead of 
the target to score hits.  
109
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 These exercises required specific control, speed, attitude, and 
altitude conditions. Through experience, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe improved their 
performance effectiveness in aerial combat. As the Americans remained neutral until the 
end of 1941, their pilots lacked such opportunities to practice and develop tactics in 
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combat. This was one reason why American air units lacked basic tactical skills for 
Operation TORCH. 
The German Luftwaffe included superior fighter pilots, who refined combat 
tactics developed during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. The Luftwaffe saw this as 
an opportunity to experiment with different maneuvers. As stated earlier, the British also 
developed seasoned veteran pilots during the Battle of Britain in 1940. Such experienced 
pilots were an extremely important asset in aerial combat.   
The RAF utilized, initially, a specific fighter formation. Its pilots flew in “vics,” a 
compacted, close, flying formation of upside Vs of three planes. This actually proved to 
be a disadvantage because the pilots lost situational awareness in this close formation. 
The British improved their tactics by studying German flight patterns utilized in the 
summer of 1940. The Luftwaffe fighter formation provided better coverage and 
flexibility for dog fighting, compared to Allied aerial patterns. Germany utilized a “finger 
of four” formation aligned in which they called a Schwarm, where planes lined up 
staggered in parings. This formation, called the Rotten, set the leader of each independent 
pair on the left side of the paring. The two fighters could maneuver independently, 
allowing for flexibility and maximum potent attack options.110
One advantage the Allied ace fighter pilots enjoyed over their Axis counterparts 
was that the number of sorties flown was limited to one hundred before they were 
reassigned to instruct new pilots. The Americans adopted this practice later in the war. 
 The difference between a 
Schwarm and a Rotten is that the latter is an enforced version with two independents 
pairings working together as larger unit formation. The flexibility of the Schwarm and 
Rotten gave Luftwaffe pilots a slight edge over the RAF.  
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German pilots did not enjoy this luxury. Rather, the policy for German fighter pilots was 
“fly-till-you-die.” They stayed in continuous service unless killed or injured in a way that 
inhibited their flying. Erich Hartmann, the war’s top fighter ace, flew 1,250 combat 
sorties in which he scored 352 kills.111
America’s folly when it entered operations in this desert, contrasted with the 
RAF’s operational transition from the British homeland to the Mediterranean and North 
Africa. Decisions relative to leadership, aircraft usage, facilities, and air tactics benefited 
its adaptation to their new theater. The RAF made use of existing tactics and developed 
new ones. These included torpedo bombing, night fighting, and aerial interception. I 
believe these additional conventions hardened the RAF into an elite air force, one with a 
greater attack and defense capacity. British air power made a difference in the outcome of 
 For this reason, Luftwaffe pilots accumulated as 
many as one thousand sorties; successful super ace fighter pilots claimed an astonishing 
numbers of kills. The Axis threat in North Africa caused the British to devise new 
methods of aerial warfare. 
 The RAF found it necessary to expand its tactics beyond fighter and bomber 
interception. It needed to develop successful methods of attacking enemy ships from the 
air. It was also important to gather vital reconnaissance information in order to give the 
ground forces better situational awareness of the location and intentions of the enemy. 
The RAF utilized the protective cover of night to organize its fighters. The British 
utilized information learned about the capabilities of its aircraft to apply their planes to 
new uses as they shifted units and operations to the Mediterranean and the North African 
desert.  
                                                 
111 Wilkinson, 31. 
 60 
the campaign, as they diminished enemy supplies and provided situational awareness of 
the battlefield from the air.112
After Great Britain’s survival in the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Ministry 
shifted gears as it re-assigned units to North Africa and the Mediterranean. Sir Hugh 
Dowding pointed to his pilots’ advantages over the Luftwaffe during the 1940 Battle of 
Britain. He said that the home advantage allowed for easier repair and recovery of most 
of the planes and pilots shot down. As the British replaced or repaired the planes, their 
surviving pilots undertook other missions.
    
113 In contrast, the vast distance over 
inhospitable terrain in the desert was equally hard on both sides, especially when aircrews 
survived crashes and the harsh desert conditions. Pilots carried desert survival gear; if 
they lived they either ended up in POW camps or were rescued by their ground forces. 
Dangers like scorpions, sandstorms, and heat exhaustion faced downed pilots on the 
vastly barren North African mainland. Well-trained pilots shot down often crash landed 
their planes in such a way that the trivial damage sustained by the plane could be repaired 
and it could be put back into service. As the British replaced or repaired their planes, their 
surviving pilots flew new missions.114
The Royal Air Force began to perform offensive maneuvers in mid 1941 and, 
simultaneously, balanced defensive and offensive operations on Malta and over the 
Mediterranean.
 North Africa tended to be different as crash sites 
were, frequently, too remote for retrieval and repair.  
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 The RAF overcame the logistical obstacles of ferrying aircraft to 
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Africa through U-boat infested waters of the Mediterranean. At this time, it needed to 
find new leadership after the Air Ministy fired Sir Hugh Dowding. Dowding had proved 
that he was an exceptional leader of the Royal Air Force; however, his defensive 
strategies and policies were not suitable to the North African front. In addition to new 
leadership for the monumental task of implementing an effective attack strategy, the RAF 
also needed logistical support. These called for a leader with the ability to organize and 
run the operation of securing and operating makeshift, under-supplied, desert air bases 
that constantly changed location with the forward advance. This was a logistical and 
operational nightmare. London appointed Air Chief Marshal Arthur Longmore to resolve 
it.116 Longmore focused on improving the maintenance and serviceability of airplanes 
and vehicles. He put together tactical units of fighters.117 Longmore faced an inherent 
problem in the command structure in place in the Middle East. Delay of orders from 
London slowed down the efficiency of the Desert Command. Political command required 
implementing war decisions quickly enough to be effective. To solve this problem, 
London on June 28, 1941, appointed Oliver Lyttelton as Minister of State in the Middle 
East. This allowed the war cabinet to be represented in the Middle East and their 
decisions to be executed without delay.118
Operations in the desert continued to create challenges for the command staff. 
Longmore encountered problems due to limited supplies and did a poor job of 
coordinating his attacks. While his forces faced poorly performing Italian units, 
Longmore failed to provide British ground units enough air cover. They struggled also 
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against the Afrika Korps led by Erwin Rommel, the “Desert Fox.” Longmore’s first 
Deputy Air Operations Chief was Air Marshal O.T. Boyd, who met an unexpected fate. 
When he flew to North Africa in November of 1940 to assume the deputy command, his 
plane came under attack by Italian fighters and crashed in Sicily. He survived, but 
became a POW.119
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 The deputy position was vacant until filled by Air Marshal Sir Arthur 
Tedder. Tedder had an important role to play, for he unseated Air Chief Marshal 
Longmore and became one of the RAF’s most successful air chief marshals.  
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Chapter 7 
Air Marshal Tedder Gives the RAF Jagged Teeth 
 
Air Chief Marshal Arthur William Tedder implemented basic changes to Royal 
Air Force organization and tactics in North Africa that assured it an offensive edge. 
Based on secondary literature concerning Tedder and his memoirs, published as Air 
Power in War, I provide an in depth analysis of Tedder’s policies and how they effected 
the RAF’s action above the desert. The three principles in his doctrine of air power 
incorporated concentration, flexibility, and mobility.120
Tedder’s second principle demanded that all squadrons became extremely 
flexible. He wanted each to be proficient in all types of aerial missions and able to switch 
between them at a moment’s notice.
 Their application greatly 
increased the performance and effectiveness of the RAF in North Africa. Bombing and 
fighter efforts were no longer “parceled out,” a disastrous strategy employed by his 
predecessor. Instead, Tedder combined and concentrated his air forces in a way that 
reflected his thee principles, which also allowed more effective Allied cooperation. He 
realized that concentrating Allied forces was a necessary step towards victory, since 
unified command facilitated maximal use of available resources. Tedder‘s leadership not 
only streamlined operations, but promoted strafing and bombing runs against enemy 
supply convoys. Under Tedder, the RAF functioned defensively and offensively.  
121
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  He aimed to achieve skilled performances by his 
air crews in air/sea attacks, communication, reconnaissance, interception, defensive 
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cover, tactical ground assault, and strategic attacks. Types of targets selected varied 
greatly from mission to mission. Pilots could be assigned to attack land communications, 
shipping ports and cargo vessels, or enemy defensive positions or support ground attacks 
by attacking enemy forward positions and covering the advance.122
Tedder’s final cardinal principle, mobility, differed greatly from Sir Hugh 
Dowding’s tactics during the Battle of Britain. Sir Hugh depended on readiness. He 
placed organized squadrons in specific positions in England that allowed them to 
scramble at a moment’s notice and attack Luftwaffe formations with the aid of radar 
ground controllers.
 Once again, 
experience and training enhanced the RAF’s versatility in aerial operations.  
123 In the North African desert, this would have failed and caused the 
airfields to be temporarily out of commission, as the Luftwaffe bombed the forward 
stations. Conversely had the British applied Tedder’s strategy, as discussed below, to the 
Battle of Britain, half of the RAF’s resources could have been transferred to a safer 
location to immediately counterstrike the enemy.124
Tedder faced a rapidly changing front in an undersupplied desert environment and 
operated without the aid of an advanced network of radar stations. He completely 
changed the mobility and organization strategy of his predecessor in favor of a plan 
tailored to the RAF’s new operational environment. He discarded unneeded equipment to 
expedite operations from the mobile air bases. His plan also minimized the ground 
support staff. These bases were easier to relocate to forward positions.
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 The greater 
flexibility of the mobile air bases in the desert under Tedder gave the RAF an advantage 
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by not limiting the units to a fixed area of operations. During the Battle of Britain, the 
amount of support ground staff was extensive, including communicators and radar 
operators. It proved close to impossible to relocate all of these resources.126 Tedder 
divided the ground staff into two; half of them were posted to a group prepared to move 
to a forward position and the other half left to operate the air base.127
The RAF tasked Tedder with a variety of missions to prepare for the crucial 
Second Battle of El Alamein. It demanded detailed information regarding the locations of 
enemy positions through reconnaissance, all the while preventing the enemy from 
locating British positions. The RAF also sought to eliminate Axis bombing attacks on 
Allied shipping carrying supplies and reinforcements through the Mediterranean.
 Tedder arranged 
proportions in such a way that two distinct and fully operational air bases could be 
established and maintained. This allowed the British to occupy forward airfields and 
quickly staff them. As the front line moved and the RAF acquired new airfields, it 
conserved precious fuel by shortening the flying distance to enemy targets. 
128 The 
next step, equally important, was to attack Axis shipping lines and land convoys to 
prevent Rommel from obtaining adequate supplies for his units in Western Libya, 
Cyrenaica, and Tunisia.129
  The British used their island colony of Malta as a strategic position, one that 
offered them an ideal strike capability on Axis shipping en route from Italy to North 
Africa. The island served as an offensive stronghold with a submarine base and units of 
Wellington bombers and Beaufighter fighter planes. These aircraft decimated Axis 
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shipping.130 As the situation in Malta under Axis air attacks worsened, Tedder devised 
ways to strike at the enemy’s supply line. On the African side, British Beaufighters 
became the leading fighter-bombers to combat attacks on Rommel’s supply columns of 
Opel trucks and supply depots containing food and ammunition.131 Tedder turned next to 
attacking Axis troops, by bombing and strafing their lines and bases with British fighters. 
RAF fighter bombers attacked Axis air fields at El Daba, Fuka, and Maaten Bagush.132 
These missions proved vital to the outcome of the Battle of El Alamein. Rommel 
attacked the Eighth Army with a depleted force and was defeated due in part to British air 
operations. The RAF integrated strategic and tactical missions under a cohesive unified 
command, controlled and coordinated air strikes, and defense and reconnaissance 
missions.133
The North African theater was split into areas, each assigned to commanders reporting to 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham. American 
General Carl Spaatz ran the joint Anglo-American Northwest African Air Force, which 
divided into three subdivisions consisting of coastal, strategic, and tactical commands. 
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Hugh Pugh Lloyd headed the coastal command, responsible for 
 This contrasted with American forces’ movements, which separated their air 
force by function from ground units, and failed to connect its air arm to operations by its 
ground forces.  
Due to soured Anglo-French relations in 1942, the British decided that the 
Americans would be better suited to deal with the territory held by the Vichy French. 
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attacking, shipping, and protecting its vital ports.134
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 General James Doolittle, with his 
much publicized background in bombers, headed the strategical command. The African 
campaign used mostly the last of the three subdivisions. Coningham headed the tactical 
command and later joined with the Desert Air Force, commanded by Air Commodore 
Harry Broadhurst. This occurred after the tactical air force finished supporting the Eighth 
Army on the ground. The tactics successfully employed by the British allowed them to 
disrupt enemy convoys, defend strategic positions, and maintain Allied air superiority 
over the desert.  
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Chapter 8 
Hunting Convoys: The RAF’s Offensive Successes 
  
Logistics was the key to fighting in the desert. Due to its vast distances supply 
lines were easily overstretched. Rommel overstretched his; lack of support rendered his 
forward units vulnerable. Supplies needed to be shipped from Axis controlled ports and 
moved by truck convoys through the desert to the ground troops. These convoys were 
inviting targets to the British Desert Air Force. It struck Axis convoys and depots; 
consequently Rommel faced shortages of ammunition, food, oil, and other supplies. The 
close proximity of the British-held airbases on Malta to Italian shipping supply routes 
gave the former great strategic importance. Between August 27 and September 4 of 1941, 
Royal Air Force aircraft based on Malta sank six Italian cargo ships en route to resupply 
Axis troops in North Africa. Later, another three ships were sunk by British submarines 
and sea mines.135
The RAF skillfully struck enemy shipping, despite the outdated aircraft available 
to them. Its pilots were proficient night fliers. The Fleet Air Arm and the 830 Squadron 
records reveal the great impact of Malta-based torpedo planes. Their attacks on Axis 
convoys greatly diminished the amount of supplies reaching the enemy. The 830 
Squadron flew Fairy Swordfish and Albacore torpedo bombers. Although slow and 
obsolescent, these planes proved to be effective in sinking enemy vessels, especially 
under the cover of night. By 1942, their efforts sunk 400,000 tons of Axis shipping, 
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hampering Rommel’s efforts in the desert.136
On January 27, 1941, Sub-Lieutenant Pat Chambers flew as the lead pilot of a 
flight against Axis convoys in the Mediterranean. This sortie consisted of six Swordfish 
biplanes, each armed with a torpedo. At an altitude of 10,000 feet, Chambers spotted a 
convoy of German ships steaming towards the African mainland.
 Swordfish aircrews operated outdated and 
under-serviced equipment yet still managed to sink their targets.  Later in the year, the 
British ran into more and more opposition from escort destroyers and suffered increased 
Swordfish losses.  
137 Twelve miles from 
the water-borne targets, the airplanes hooked a wide turn. This maneuver expended much 
time, due to the slow turning radius of his aircraft. Nonetheless, the Sub-Lieutenant 
released his torpedo after his systematic dive, and it sank a 3,950 ton German merchant 
ship registered under the name Ingo.138
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 Chambers’ wing man, Campbell, bombed the 
cruiser Duisburg, the Ingo’s 7,500 ton escort. Their attack exemplified the Royal Air 
Force’s successful tactical attacks on Axis shipping. The six planes were lucky, since the 
slow Swordfish biplane presented a vulnerable target to all Axis fighter types. 
Fortunately too for the British attackers, the German ships lacked sufficient air defense 
guns. This and other successes against Axis shipping ensured that Rommel’s units ran 
short of supplies. Also, these missions gave British pilots experience in advanced tactics 
of aerial warfare against ships. American pilots lacked such opportunities to gain skills in 
combat prior to Operation TORCH. This difference elevated the British pilots into a class 
above American pilots, not only in combat experience, but in versatility of aerial combat 
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skills. British actions against German convoys greatly benefited the Eighth Army, their 
ground forces fighting in the desert campaign.  
Efforts of the Royal Air Force against Axis supply line set back Rommel’s 
advance. Lack of fuel stopped or delayed Rommel on multiple occasions. Logistics is the 
lifeblood of all military operations. The RAF sank or damaged a crucial amount of 
shipping. According to Craven, the British air effort attacked Rommel’s supplies so 
thoroughly on one occasion that only three days of rations for his units remained. This 
misfortune affected his attack from El Agheila in January 1942, as it forced Rommel to 
supplement his meager supplies by capturing or raiding British supply dumps.139
One of these involved Junkers Ju-52 transport planes. The Germans loaded them 
with supplies and flew them across the Mediterranean to Africa. These aircraft normally 
deployed paratroops. Revealed in a series of archival photographs, the packing of the Ju-
52s reflected creativity on the part of their German crews. They positioned ammunition 
belts around drums of fuel and stacked boxes of supplies to maximize their load.
 As the 
amount of supplies reaching German ground troops diminished, they resorted to drastic 
and risky alternative measures increased.  
140 The 
Luftwaffe accumulated stocks of aircraft fuel in Cyrenaica to support Rommel’s 
approaching May 26th offensive, but, due to its prolonged scale, that supply quickly 
evaporated. Pressure from Allied attacks on Axis shipping hindered their resupply effort 
to such an extent, that the Afrika Korps’ supplies were exhausted by the end of June. This 
also forced the Luftwaffe to downsize its air effort.141
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Without fuel and ammunition, a modern army could not operate efficiently. In this 
case, the Afrika Korps was over-extended and vulnerable to air attack. Still, Rommel 
needed fresh supplies. In August of 1942, provisions dispatched to re-supply Axis forces 
in North Africa amounted to 100,000 gross tons. The RAF, USAAF, and the Royal Navy 
sank 80,000 tons, four-fifths of it. Allied air forces alone accounted for forty percent of 
this loss.142
Britain’s government saw that the tactical air policies implemented by Tedder for 
attacking Rommel’s supplies produced results against Rommel, but the British took the 
good news with reserve. According to one official British source, a report from Mollie 
Panter-Downs in London War Notes, dated September 13, 1942, London’s attitude 
towards the likelihood of defeating Rommel remained optimistic, even though the British 
realized the “Desert Fox” would persist in his efforts against the Eighth Army.
 This was due, in part, to RAF attacks against Axis ports. Harbors presented 
choice targets for air attacks. They were often set ablaze and temporarily rendered 
unusable for handling cargo ships.  
143
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 The 
public was more pessimistic due to earlier misinformation it had received concealing 
British setbacks at the hands of the Afrika Korps in the desert. Specific evidence 
regarding Malta indicated the effectiveness of Royal Air Force efforts there. Although the 
public lacked a precise understanding of the severity of damage suffered on Malta 
from Axis air attacks, they were informed of the courageousness and of the RAF pilots 
and air defense units on the island.    
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Chapter 9 
The Experiences of the Desert Air Force 
 
The superior quality of pilots in the RAF derived in part from their defensive air 
maneuvers, which resulted in their high survival rate. Combat perfected RAF tactics. Its 
pilots developed into war-hardened veterans.  The desert campaign developed some 
exceptional leaders in the RAF, such as fighter pilot and squadron leader George Barclay. 
Barclay took over command of No. 238 Squadron in the El Alamein campaign. A bold 
leader, likable to his crew and fellow airmen, Barclay was a model RAF officer. Seeking 
to perfect his air combat performance, he worked out wing formation tactics and 
strategies in his diary.144
Promoted on October 3, 1941, to Flight Lieutenant, he transferred to Hornchurch 
where he assumed command Flight No. 611 Squadron, a unit that later played a 
significant role in the First Battle of El Alamein.
 His diary, combined with operations records books provides 
insight into his experience.  
145 Barclay and his squadron arrived 
ahead of their supplies and planes at Maryut, Egypt. As the planes arrived and the 
squadron readied itself for operations, the situation in Tobruk deteriorated so badly that 
its garrison surrendered to the Germans on June 19, 1942. The loss of Tobruk forced the 
8th Army to retreat east behind the El Alamein lines.146
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 The British 238th faced a 
seasoned, well-equipped enemy in the struggle for air supremacy. The Luftwaffe’s 
veteran aces, equipped with superior fighters, inflicted heavy losses on Barclay’s 
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squadron. Barclay himself died in action on July 17, 1942, leading flight of Hurricanes 
against a group of twelve J-87 Stukas protected by fighter escort. Despite Barclay’s 
defensive maneuvers, a BF 109 shot him down.147
These gallant RAF pilots fought well but needed American pilots to reinforce 
their strength during North African campaign. A technical problem delayed the American 
air units scheduled to arrive in North Africa by the end of June 1942 to assist the RAF 
Desert Air Force. These units flew missions without support from their ground and 
maintenance personnel. This forced the British to allocate maintenance personnel to 
service the newly arrived Americans.
  From his diary, we learn how British 
fighter leaders utilized their extensive knowledge in combat.  
148  This burdened Tedder, who already limited the 
number of ground personnel in order to make bases flexible and easy to relocate. He 
acted to increase their number.149
Britain’s efforts to integrate inexperienced American pilots into their units caused 
real problems. Despite the difficulties these allies attempted to work together and 
established a joint headquarters to command both ground and air forces. The 
commanders of the British Eighth Army and Western Desert Air Force cooperated in 
targeting Axis forces. Within the Western Air Force, Air Vice-Marshal Arthur 
Coningham led the No. 211 Group, which included fighter squadrons. The RAF sent 
Royal Engineers to build forward aerodromes, protected by armored-car units and anti-
aircraft guns. Sir Arthur’s group flew Hurricane fighters, as well as obsolete American P-
   
                                                 
147 Barclay, 197. 
148 Craven, 15.  
149 Memo for Sec., WDGS and Flag., Hq. CINC US Fleet, from Lt. Col. Holms, Asst. Sec., JCS, 8 July 
1942. 
 74 
40 Tomahawks and the improved Kittyhawk fighters. 150Tedder kept his force as mobile 
as possible to maintain its flexibility for attacking targets of opportunity. The American 
66th Fighter Group participated in operations leading up to the second El Alamein Battle, 
late in 1942. The 57th Fighter Group and 12th Bomber Group trained and worked in 
cooperation with RAF units.151
The Italian forces in North Africa continued to experience humiliating defeats 
stretching back to the beginning of their African campaign in mid-1940. The Italian Air 
Force lacked the experience and advanced planes the Luftwaffe enjoyed. A postwar 
Italian source reveals that Mussolini’s air force suffered from underdeveloped planes and 
inefficient organization.
 Unfamiliar with combat over the desert and fresh from 
training, the Americans seemed, nonetheless, eager to fight. Their units faced many 
obstacles. 
152 Their best fighter plane, the Macchi MC 200, came closest to 
equaling the British Hawker Hurricane.153 Italy’s poor performance prompted Hitler to 
provide assistance. Luftwaffe units arrived in North Africa. The Hawker Hurricane, 
superior to Reggio Aeronautica planes, then faced the better performing BF109. The 
Hurricane was vulnerable due to its wing-mounted main fuel tanks. A single hit could 
ignite the sloshing combustible liquid, which could envelop the pilot in a tunnel of 
flames.154
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 This resulted in heavy losses on the British side. When the Luftwaffe shot 
down one RAF pilot on September 14, 1941, he escaped the wreckage severely burned 
and was taken prisoner. The Luftwaffe unit involved wrote his squadron a note disclosing 
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the condition of Lt. Byers and that he would recover in a German hospital in Derna.155
The turning point in the fight for air supremacy occurred during the Crusader 
offensive in late 1941. The RAF used the addition of high flying Spitfires its advantage. 
When the Eighth Army struggled on the ground at El Alamein, RAF fighters relinquished 
their original objectives to focus on Axis bombers. The first RAF squadron to arrive and 
fight in the first Battle of El Alamein, the misused 73rd Squadron, was ordered to strafe 
Axis ground units relentlessly.
 
The Germans under Rommel generally treated British prisoners of war with respect. 
British pilots, when healed and liberated, often flew again.  
156 Later, the Desert Air Force improved its tactics in order 
to provide greater assistance to the ground troops. Axis aircraft frequently disrupted 
Allied efforts in assisting the army. BF109 units shot down 1,400 British planes between 
April 1941 and December 1942, while the RAF claimed 1,200 kills and the USAAF 
another fifty. Even though the Luftwaffe shot down more planes, neither side fully 
achieved air superiority, due to their immense losses. Axis aircraft losses on the ground 
far exceeded Allied losses. During Crusader, the British pilots in combat above the desert 
adopted, successfully a variation of the finger of four formations, using the German 
tactics.157 When attacking convoys, the British used a technique called the defensive 
circle. This tactic proved effective until the German ace, Hans-Joachim Marseille, 
discovered a way to turn it into a death trap for British pilots.158
The Luftwaffe’s high numbers of air kills were achieved mostly by a few expert 
aces, particularly Hans-Joachim Marseille. He alone shot down one hundred fifty-eight 
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Allied planes and became a menace over the desert.159 Out of the actual 1,300 odd air 
victories claimed by the Luftwaffe over the desert, fifteen pilots accounted for 674 kills, 
with the top fifty-three pilots accounted for 1,042 of those victories.160
In the skies over North Africa, British pilots improved many different tactics 
concerning aerial combat, including night fighting. The night operations in the second 
battle of El Alamein, at the landing ground Burg-el-Arab on October 27, 1942, involved 
Hawker Hurricanes.
 The German aces 
produced this imbalance of air to air kills because of their extensive experience and 
frequency of air combat. The lop-sidedness of these victory figures was due, too, to the 
nature of German air combat tactics. Their fighters flew in pairs of fours that allowed the 
lead fighter to accumulate kills, while protected by his usually lesser experienced 
wingman. The Luftwaffe was as a dangerous opponent and posed a serious threat to the 
Desert Air Force. The Axis forces continued to attack also in the Mediterranean, 
concentrating on Malta. 
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  The RAF’s goal was to hit the enemy at night behind his lines, to 
prevent Axis planes from attacking the Eighth Army. The British Desert Air Force 
utilized this technique with some success and learned the value of attacking grounded 
enemy planes under the cover of night. This strategy generated a new mentality for pilots, 
as targets now appeared impersonal; the speck on the ground belonging to a truck, boat, 
and a grounded aircraft showed little signs of humanity compared to a dogfight where 
one was faced with an opponent at roughly equal terms in a life and death the struggle. 
Fortunately, these night raids encountered minimal air resistance. 
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 The versatile nature of the RAF Fighter Command allowed for a variety of tactics 
that played to the strengths of their aircraft. One strong difference between British and 
American pilots was that often the former alone possessed the necessary skills to perform 
at night. The RAF pilots’ advanced training served them well, as they could fly and 
navigate in the dark. The Americans did not capitalize on the potential advantages of 
striking at night even later in the war, as American generals insisted on daylight bombing 
raids. These often ended in disaster. RAF Bomber Command and parts of RAF Fighter 
Command shared the ability to strike at night. 
Unlike the British, the United States air forces experienced a peaceful home front 
situation; no enemy posed a threat to America’s shores prior to the surprise attack on 
Pearl Harbor in December of 1941. Without this challenge, American air combat 
effectiveness failed to develop prior to TORCH. Without experiencing bombs falling on 
American target areas,  American air units neglected significant operations, including 
development of fighter tactics to intercept bombers, construction of air defense networks, 
and pilot-training with actual flight combat scenarios. Isolationism prevailed among 
American society. These mistakes were evident at Pearl Harbor, where American 
misunderstanding of preventive measures led to the elementary mistake of grouping 
fighter aircraft together and openly on airfields, thereby creating ideal targets for the 
attacking Japanese. General Walter Short commanding on Oahu thought such clustering a 
wise choice, since he incorrectly concluded that sabotage was the serious threat. In 
reality, his action made it possible for a few bombs to demolish his warplanes. Had 
American forces experienced intense bombing, as had the British on Malta, they would 
have known to spread out their aircraft to minimize the chance of destruction. My 
 78 
secondary sources agree that Britain’s previous air combat experience factored into its 
successful performance in the desert and Mediterranean. The United States needed to 
learn the lessons acquired by the British through air operations on Malta and over the 
Western Desert.   
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Chapter 10 
Malta: Supreme Air Experience of Survival and Convoy Elimination. 
 
The RAF developed tactics and strategies to defend Malta from invasion, as well 
as attack enemy shipping convoys. Its defense of Malta and attacks on Axis convoys 
impacted the war in the Western Desert. Hardships endured by service men on Malta 
strengthened their resolve, as they survived relentless enemy bombing. RAF personal 
stationed on Malta became battle-hardened, innovative, and experienced.162
 Malta’s naval port submarine base and strategically significant airfields were key 
assets for Britain’s war effort. The Hal Far airfield, opened in 1929, located in the 
southernmost part of the island, was designated Malta’s RAF station. Both this station 
and, later, the airfield in the island’s center at Ta’Qali used grassy and stony fields. 
Surfaces such as these made operations difficult under rainy conditions. 
  
163
Malta was an important island to hold and had a long history including its great 
siege of 1564 by the Turks. In 1814, the British acquired Malta through the Treaty of 
Vienna.
  
164 Malta’s naval base opened roughly at the same time as the Suez Canal, in 
1869.165
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 Malta’s strategic and geographic position rendered it vital to British policy. The 
Axis powers targeted Malta because of its advantageous location for both the Royal Air 
Force and the Royal Navy. Malta’s natural harbors provided an excellent submarine base, 
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and its airstrips allowed possible strikes against the Axis shipping bound for North 
Africa.166
For a prolonged period, Malta withstood constant bombardment by Axis bombers. 
The arrival of the Luftwaffe in early 1941 added greatly to the effort began in 1940 by 
Mussolini’s air force. Stuka dive bombers hit British shipping with lethal accuracy.
  
167
Under the pressure of bombardment, the British improvised methods for their 
survival. Key headquarters were moved into caves, and efforts commenced to counter the 
aerial attacks. The British dug their headquarters into the underground rock. Lord Gort, 
Malta’s Governor-General, met with ACM Tedder, General Timberlake, and General 
Brereton to discuss the state of the island’s defense.
 
The Italians, with German support, continued their brutal attacks not only on Allied 
shipping attempting to re-supply Malta, but on the island itself.   
168 The Royal Malta Force needed to 
test the structural integrity of the aerodromes of the island’s air bases to prepare them to 
withstand further bombardment. They ordered Gladiator Fighters to fire on select 
buildings to determine if their defenses were adequate for protecting aircraft and fuel. If 
the bullets got through, they redoubled their efforts to reinforce these structures. The 
island’s defenders also imposed curfews to help protect base personnel from Axis planes 
during night raids.169 While the pilots often received credit for defending the island, the 
largely unsung heroes were the ground crews who constantly fueled, armed, inspected, 
and repaired the aircraft.170 171
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Since the Axis implemented a tight blockade on Malta, food on the island became 
scarce; Malta’s most serious problem was its shortage of food, as supply convoys had an 
extremely tough time getting through the Axis lines. George F. Beurling, a Spitfire pilot 
based on Malta, also wrote in his memoirs that he and fellow British airmen ate food they 
dubbed “siege grub”: bully beef in many different creative variations supplemented with 
Maltese cabbage.172 Everyone ate “siege grub” regardless of rank, for at the time it was 
the only nourishment available however, the sergeant pilots lived in relative comfort in 
fairly large private homes.173
As Malta eagerly awaited relief, it faced problems beyond the enemy bombers. 
Fliegerkorps X, General Geisler’s anti-shipping unit, included JU 87, JU 88, and ME 110 
aircraft. It attacked the island furiously throughout the month of January of 1941.
 Many of the Maltese hid in caves during bombardments. 
Despite the problems from shortages of food, ammunition, spare parts, and fuel for the 
aircraft, the RAF on Malta operated three hundred aircraft. Unless supply convoys 
arrived, this would be impossible and Malta could be starved out. 
174
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Stuka dive bombers created chaos for Maltese civilians. These planes banked to set up 
their attacks, and then, without warning, plummeted towards the earth targeting houses 
and civilians. As they executed their attacks, the metal screamers on the wheel pants 
howled a deafening sound meant to strike fear in the hearts of its victims on the ground. 
They also dove at a steep 70 degree dive for precision bombing. The bombs contained 
metal scabbards from German bayonets to achieve a whistling effect, a practice used 
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exclusively by the Luftwaffe.175 The twin engine JU 88 delivered heavier bomb loads at 
typically 30 degree dives with up to 2,000 kilograms of explosives.176 After the Stukas 
returned to Sicily on January 9, 1941, they left three Wellingtons damaged beyond repair 
at Luqa.177
In March of 1942, the Luftwaffe began a yet more focused set of attacks. 
Luftwaffe General Fieldmarschall Albert Kesselring and General der Flieger Paul 
Deichmann implemented a plan of attack to disable and destroy the important military 
targets, the airfields, port, and submarine base on Malta. Its first priority was to eliminate 
the British fighters on the ground by means of surprise attacks at the air base located in 
Ta Kali. The next objectives were the bomber and torpedo-planes based out of Luca, Hal 
Far, and Calafrana. German aviators also sought to map out the effects bombing the 
docks and harbors of the Valletta naval base.
 These dive bombers made it difficult for the British to ship relief supplies to 
the island. Their attacks continued throughout the year. 
178 On March 20, 1942, the Luftwaffe 
conducted the first carpet bombing of the war in the Mediterranean, targeting Ta Kali. 
This assault paled in comparison of scale to the immense carpet bombing that 
followed.179 German pilots were well-trained. The Italian pilots seemed more apathetic in 
their philosophy. They functioned less efficiently as a team compared to the Germans.180
Malta lacked effective defensive aircraft. German BF-109s outmatched Malta’s 
Hurricanes and attacked relentlessly, in wave after wave. The island’s defenders needed 
the Supermarine Spitfire to compete with the high performance BF-109s. The British 
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command on Malta was so desperate to obtain Spitfires that it accepted a shipment of 
fifteen in 1942 painted in the wrong camouflage scheme. While Malta needed aircraft 
painted in a sea pattern with dark and light blues, it received instead planes dressed in 
desert hues of brown and beige.181 Nonetheless, many sources highlight the great relief of 
the pilots who had been defending Malta with outmatched planes when the newly arrived 
Spitfires alleviated their strain and substantially raised their morale level. However, 
tactical use of the planes proved not to be a decisive factor in the overall protection of the 
RAF’s Maltese air bases.182
Germany’s air units in the Mediterranean were dispersed over six general areas: 
Tripolitania, Tunisia, Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and the Aegean, which included Greece. 
Their total force was eight hundred ninety Axis aircraft, two hundred eighty of which 
were fighters.
 Courage, persistence and tenacity of the pilots and Maltese 
people won the campaign; they survived against heavy odds.   
183 The Luftwaffe stationed many of its planes in Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia, 
around three hundred and ninety aircraft. That number included ten dive bombers, two 
hundred seventy bombers, and eighty fighters. These planes were based within close 
striking distance of Malta.184 Tripolitania and Tunisia contained the second largest 
grouping of Luftwaffe planes, with one hundred fifty and one hundred forty planes 
respectively.185
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 This deployment of German planes meant that Malta could anticipate 
bombings of much greater magnitude. The Wehrmacht faced great difficulty in managing 
the flow of its resources. While they put relentless pressure on the British at Malta, they 
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were fighting on multiple fronts and found it difficult to supply and keep up their air 
strength in the Mediterranean theater.186 The Luftwaffe transferred many bombers from 
the Mediterranean to the Eastern Front despite its need for them in operations against 
Malta. Its core bomber fleet dwindled away as Berlin transferred two hundred eighty-five 
aircraft to Russia within the short span of two months.187
The Italians and Germans targeted Malta with systematic and often around the 
clock aerial bombardment. The location of Italian airfields only sixty miles off the coast 
of Malta allowed easy access for Axis bombers to strike the island.
 In the African desert, the Afrika 
Korps under Rommel won victories; particularly in blunting British attacks but often 
could not exploit these triumphs due to its lack of supplies.  
188 Malta’s defenses 
did not include a radar-based intercept infrastructure. The island relied instead on visual 
observers. Early in the air raids only four outdated Gladiator aircraft protected Malta. 
These biplanes remained at full readiness on a twenty-four hour basis. However, the 
official report on Malta revealed that only three of them survived the first engagement. 
This left the entire defense of the island dependent on three archaic aircraft, named 
respectively Faith, Hope, and Charity.189 The bombardments took lives and destroyed 
important infrastructure. Six Royal Malta artillerymen died during one Axis 
bombardment of the island.190
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 Further attacks produced numerous additional military 
casualties. British troops stationed at Fort St. Elmo fired rounds desperately at incoming 
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Italian bombers, until many met their deaths.191 Axis bombs struck Valletta, the Maltese 
capital, an average of eight times daily. In April of 1942, the Axis dropped over 6,728 
tons of bombs on the island.192  On April 7, 1942, Malta endured its 2000th raid in a 
succession of attacks that appeared endless.193 Malta‘s defenders received the George 
Cross from King George VI for endurance and resilience during the bombardment on 
April 15, 1942.194
 With German planes and support supplies sent to Russia, the Germans faced 
great difficulty in sending sufficient support needed in the North African and 
Mediterranean. The limited supplies sent were allocated to bolster the efforts of Rommel 
and, for this reason, the Italian forces made up the greater part of the forces attacking 
Malta.
 While the King formally recognized Malta for the anguish it withstood, 
the attacks continued.  
195 The limitations on available aircraft and materials challenged Albert Kesselring 
while serving as the commander and chief of the south Luftwaffe forces designated to 
bomb Malta. Kesselring reported that losing planes on the Eastern Front negatively 
impacted his operations in the Mediterranean. In a letter in early April, 1942, Kesselring 
wrote that the Luftwaffe was highly successful in suppressing Malta. In the long run 
however, due to the weakening of his available Mediterranean forces, he foresaw that his 
decreased air strength would not keep Malta suppressed.196
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 On May 21, Hitler postponed 
indefinitely his scheduled invasion of the island. This also ended Malta’s aerial siege. 
Hitler’s termination of  ‘Operation Hercules’ can only be understood by considering the 
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costliness of the earlier Operation Marita, the 1941 German airborne assault on Crete. On 
May 20 of that year, Germany invaded Crete by landing its 7th Airborne Division on the 
island by gliders and parachutes. These Luftwaffe troops suffered heavy casualties, yet 
managed to take the island. During this operation, the Luftwaffe enjoyed the luxury of 
complete air superiority. Five hundred transport aircraft and one hundred gliders, packed 
with German airborne troops, descended on Crete. The few and widely spaced Greek air 
fields clogged up with the heavy German traffic of one hundred eighty fighters, two 
hundred eighty bombers, one hundred fifty dive bombers, and forty reconnaissance 
aircraft.197 German parachutists filled the sky; 22,750 elite German troops landed on 
Crete. Although they succeeded, the Germans suffered heavy casualties. The 7th Airborne 
experienced more losses in the Crete operation than the Wehrmacht did in its earlier 
mainland invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia combined.198 During the initial hours of 
combat on Crete, the German units suffered fifty percent casualties. Operation Marita 
cost Germany around 11,375 men.199
Marita’s shockingly high casualty rate appalled Hitler; he chose not to use 
airborne units for his future invasions. He also prioritized his resources. Hitler considered 
Russia a far more important goal than Malta or Egypt. He refused to commit large forces 
against Malta at this time and insisted on transferring units to the Eastern Front. He 
assumed the Italians could suppress the island, and planned to deploy German forces 
there in late July. If the Germans had used paratroops, an airborne assault on Malta would 
most likely have succeeded. The British defenders stationed on Malta could not defeat the 
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elite German paratroops since they lacked the quantity of small arms sufficient for 
defense.  While Axis commanders believed that their efforts were reducing Malta to 
submission, the British survived there and continued to strike Axis convoys.200
The aircrews stationed on Malta remained in a constant state of war, through 
missions against convoys or defending the island from continuous attack and 
bombardment. The non-commissioned officers enforced heightened air base security by 
conducting patrols of the instillation armed with loaded revolvers.
 Many of 
the supplies sent to North Africa never arrived because of British attacks by aircraft based 
on Malta.  
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 Their patrols kept 
order to the fragile situation of limited supplies and constant bombardment. These 
hardships increased the resolve of the pilots to protect the island. Personnel were 
successful in reconstructing damaged hangers and moving aircraft over a shelled tarmac. 
The constant bombings remained so fierce that returning aircraft stationed in Malta often 
had to deal with combat over their airfields. One episode involved of a group of 
Swordfish returning to Malta, after its night convoy raid, while the base was under attack 
by the Luftwaffe. Due to the timely presence of Hurricanes, the BF-109s were driven off, 
and heavy losses among the obsolete Swordfish bombers were avoided. The available 
records indicate that the majority of the planes survived, however they did not specify the 
number of losses. The planes that landed safely folded their wings to minimize target 
surface area exposed to overhead attack. Despite these precautions, a follow up attack by 
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JU-88s destroyed two of the Swordfish parked on the ground. This illustrates the real risk 
involved in basing planes at an airfield under constant pressure of attack.202
 BF-109 pilots classified the slow moving Swordfish formation as easy targets. 
The group of Swordfish flew between “friendly” ground fire and the firepower of the BF-
109s.
 
203
The British relied heavily on American shipping to move its fighters and supplies 
to Gibraltar and into the Mediterranean and North African theaters of operation. 
Mechanics found that engine spare parts for the new types of fighters were in short 
supply. The improved Hurricane II fighters slowly replaced older models, although they 
paled in comparison to the Spitfire, a truly exceptional fighter against its German 
opponents. The British had great difficulty shipping Spitfires to North Africa due to its 
elongated wings, appendages too long to fit on the elevators of most conventional aircraft 
carriers. In June, Britain’s Middle East Air Force included five hundred and fifty-nine 
planes divided into thirty-four squadrons. Four hundred and nineteen of these were 
newer, up-to-date models. As shipments arrived on carriers, they replaced obsolete 
aircraft and increased the number of available British planes. 
 Malta desperately needed additional fighter planes to protect its torpedo 
bombers. Improvising with outdated aircraft and equipment proved effective; despite 
being outnumbered, the few fighters allotted to protect the torpedo planes kept the enemy 
fighters away from the bombers. Only later when more advanced planes, such as 
Spitfires, arrived, did the RAF on Malta conduct its air operations relatively unhindered.  
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 The British had seven 
hundred and eighty newer planes out of total eight hundred forty-six aircraft in the 
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adjacent theaters by mid-October. Organizationally, its air arm expanded to fifty-two 
operational squadrons.205 Although the arrival of Spitfires was welcomed, they provided 
little relief at first, as the Germans destroyed the first shipment within seventy-two hours 
of its arrival. Due to the vulnerability of the planes on Malta’s cratered airfields and the 
difficulties and inabilities of the ground crews to repair bombed planes, German bombers 
destroyed or rendered the Spitfires useless. 206
Shipments between Gibraltar and Alexandria included cargos of food, petrol, 
ammunition, parts, aircraft, and oil. Their voyage followed a route of eight hundred miles 
across the Mediterranean, but Malta was only a few minutes flight time from Axis 
airfields.
 Improved defenses were required for the 
survival of the next Spitfires shipped to the island. After this was accomplished, Spitfires 
played a dual role, attacking Axis convoys and defending Malta from Axis air attacks.  
207 This perilous journey was necessary to deliver vital supplies to Malta. 
Shipping planes by sea was also very risky. Producing and delivering aircraft was costly, 
yet the RAF needed desperately to import newer model planes for use in Malta and the 
Desert Air Force. In August 1942, a convoy of fourteen ships involved in the largest such 
relief operation, code named Operation Pedestal, sailed for the island. Pedestal intended 
to provide Malta with the oil and other supplies desperately needed for its survival.208
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Among these vessels, the oil tanker remained the most crucial, due to the island’s dire 
fuel situation. The aircraft carrier HMS Eagle, loaded with new model aircraft to relieve 
the losses endured on Malta, escorted the convoy. The British originally built Eagle to 
serve as a seaplane platform in 1919, one of the earliest full deck carriers in the British 
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fleet.209 It lacked the modernity and the space of newer American carriers. Eagle came 
under attack by U-boat and Axis dive bombers early in its voyage. The enemy targeted 
the carrier because its cargo provided the island’s best defense. On August 11, 1942, the 
Luftwaffe struck the slow moving convoy and sank nine ships, including the Eagle.210 
Only five ships in the convoy reached the island, and all of them had sustained heavy 
damage.211 Yet again a relief convoy intended for Malta met with disaster. Fortuitously, 
the oil tanker survived the onslaught and provided Malta with fuel necessary to continue 
air operations. This supply of fuel extended the island’s life expectancy by ten weeks.212
Tedder worried that severe losses among convoys sailing to resupply Malta would 
disastrously impact the fighting spirit and effectiveness of personnel garrisoned there. He 
replaced General Dobbie as the British commander on Malta with General Gort.
  
213 While 
Tedder hoped to reestablish morale among the men, problems remained. Acts of 
insubordination and disregard for the chain of command continued during General Gort’s 
watch. Reports of decreased morale on Malta convinced Tedder that a defensive, defeatist 
atmosphere dominated the garrison on Malta.214
Historians disagree whether the arrival of the Spitfires on Malta made a large 
difference to its defense. The London Times claimed that they did, emphasizing the 
numbers of downed aircraft attributed to the Spitfires and other aircraft based on Malta. 
 Gort tried very hard to keep his defenses 
alert, a difficult task, as the pilots and antiaircraft gunners operated under extremely 
stressful conditions.  
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This assessment relied on results from the time period after the ill-fated shipment from 
the Wasp. Flying from Malta, the RAF lost thirty-four aircraft but managed to shoot 
down two hundred and four Axis aircraft in the renewed attacks that began in early 
October of 1942.215 On October 11 alone, Maltese-based Spitfires destroyed eight of the 
fifty-eight attacking Luftwaffe bombers along with seven Axis fighters. In this raid Malta 
suffered a death toll of eighty, as well as total destruction of four hundred and sixty-nine 
buildings.216 With much of its civil and military infrastructure pulverized, it was unclear 
how long Malta could survive. On October 13, 1942, the London Times reported eight 
kills by the defending aircraft, contributing to a total of fifty-six enemy aircraft destroyed 
in the month of October.217
Malta continued to endure intense bombardment from Axis aircraft late into 1942, 
during the Allies’ preparation for Operation TORCH. On October 15, 1942, the London 
Times claimed that the success of Malta-based planes in disrupting Axis shipping 
convoys were a probable cause of its continued bombardment by the Axis.
 These numbers reflected the tenacity of the British pilots who 
held out against the onslaught of enemy air attacks. The Times carefully crafted its 
coverage to deemphasize, or at times omit, news of British military failures and losses, 
for they deemed them too negative for public knowledge.  
218 The Times 
also disclosed that the official German report boasted the destruction of fifteen Allied 
aircraft and effectively damaged British aerodromes. However, it implied that Malta was 
inadequately defended.219
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While such news coverage failed to reveal to the British public the severity of the 
Maltese ordeal, the garrisons on the island endured. As Malta survived, RAF pilots 
gained skills necessary to conduct attacks on Axis convoys. While RAF pilots improved 
their flight skills, the RAF soon had to cope with underpowered American planes, which 
arrived to replenish its strength. Later, inexperienced American pilots were sent into 
battle. These pilots were ill-equipped to face a well trained experienced enemy.  
As Malta remained an important area of operation, the war in North Africa raged 
on. In late October and early November of 1942, the lengthy Second Battle of El Alamein 
occurred on the African mainland as Malta suffered heavy attacks by the Luftwaffe. 220
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These renewed attacks continued later in November, as the joint invasion of Morocco and 
Algeria by Britain and the United States was approaching. After the November 7 and 8 
TORCH landings, Malta was used as an Allied reconnaissance platform for determining 
Axis positions in Tunisia. 
With such intense air combat over Malta, it is a wonder why American pilots 
were not sent sooner to assist in the defense of the island. This action could have 
provided valuable combat experience to the American pilots, while at the same time, 
affording relief for overworked RAF pilots. This deployment was not considered by the 
Allies as America focused on the task of training and preparing its forces. 
  
 
 
 
 93 
Chapter 11 
American Aid: Help or Hindrance? 
 
The Malta-based RAF pilots’ constant exposure to combat set them apart from the 
green American aviators. Both the Mediterranean and North African desert were harsh 
and unforgiving to airmen. The RAF pilots on Malta worked with outdated, under-
equipped aircraft at air stations subjected to frequent bombardment. RAF pilots based in 
the desert coped with unrelenting flies, heat, and sand. Classroom instruction could not 
effectively teach coping methods for operations in these conditions. Through their flight 
experience and exposure to these adverse conditions, RAF pilots became battle-hardened. 
The British airmen tended to perceive their green American counterparts as overeager for 
action and oblivious to the harsh conditions of the war.221
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 America’s neutrality had 
sheltered American pilots from the wartime realities faced by the RAF. While America 
remained neutral, the RAF’s participation in the 1940 battles of France and Britain 
exposed it to modern air warfare. Afterwards, RAF pilots were, predominately, seasoned 
veterans had developed valuable skills and tactics through combat, experience which set 
them well above the level of preparedness of their American counterparts. Not only did 
the Americans, at this time, lack the fighting experience and skills that the RAF acquired 
through combating the Axis, their level of training was not equal to the training of new 
British pilots, from instructors who were survivors of the 1940 and 1941 air battles.  
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The British believed that American pilots needed to learn how to conduct their air 
operation as modern warfare from the RAF, since America’s isolationism engendered a 
state of military un-preparedness. The few American pilots fortunate enough to have been 
shipped to Britain before TORCH received such training. This gave them an advantage, 
but they still lacked the skills to even attain a survivable level of readiness. The Royal Air 
Force training program required an intense and rigorous training regiment, including 
several months of flight time in actual combat aircraft. American pilots flew either 
Hurricanes or Spitfires for the short time they trained with the RAF.222
Many analysts from both Axis and Allied countries thought the entrance of the 
United States would bring great change to the war, since America possessed immense 
quantities of personnel and resources.
 It would take a 
complex, costly campaign, to elevate America’s green pilots to the level of those flying in 
the RAF.  
223
The British knew that the American Air Force’s inexperience left its pilots unable 
to defeat the Luftwaffe. Churchill’s chief military representative in Washington, Sir John 
 The United States’ failure to advance its military 
technology in order keep up with the high standards of the rest of the world, especially in 
the areas of tanks and fighter aircraft, was one of its more prevalent war-related 
problems. Furthermore, American fighter units lacked the training and experience needed 
to fight a modern air war. The machines, tactics, and strategies of air combat had 
developed significantly since America’s involvement in the First World War. Without 
engaging the Luftwaffe in combat, American pilot trainees learned theory and practiced 
maneuvers without the assistance of air war veterans.  
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Dill, informed London that American military forces “are more unready for war than it is 
possible to imagine.”224 Untested, obsolete planes and equipment plagued America in its 
effort to function on an equal level with its ally. The battered British war machine 
benefited from years of fighting, its performance improved through combat. The aircraft 
delivered from America to Britain though the Lend Lease Agreement needed to be 
modified for desert use. Even then, these American fighter planes could not compete with 
those of the Luftwaffe’s fighters.225
The harsh environment of the North African theater posed challenges to the 
airplanes as well. Aircraft modifications were necessary to operate in the desert. Under 
the Lend Lease Agreement, the RAF received numerous American-made aircraft shipped 
for use in North Africa. This program supplied the British Desert Air Force with 
 Despite those problems, Great Britain desired the 
United States as an ally, for they needed its manpower and war materials. The British 
realized they could not alone defeat Germany and Italy, so they sought American 
involvement. 
 The unique environment in the North Africa theater presented several challenges. 
The physical environment seriously impacted military operations. Wide expanses of flat 
desert, with few landmarks, made navigation difficult. Pilots needed to use their maps 
and navigation methods successfully in order to fly to the correct coordinates on specific 
missions. The desert’s heat depleted the strength of pilots, both in and out of their 
cockpits. Most American military training aimed for deployment in moderate climates 
ideal for aviation. Without experience in desert survival, fighting there demanded major 
adjustments for American pilots and troops alike.  
                                                 
224 Atkinson, 8.  
225 Craven, 29. 
 96 
American fighters, such as the Curtiss P-40 Warhawk. The British modified the P-40s 
further for desert combat, based on what they learned during combat against the 
Luftwaffe during the Cyrenaica campaign.226 The poorly constructed P-40 proved ill-
suited to the desert environment. The American-manufactured planes frequently crashed; 
accidents due to mechanical errors occurred.227
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 The British faced another problem when 
they found that the American planes arrived without spare parts or mechanics. This 
created difficulties for repairing the aircraft. American and British parts were 
incompatible. Also, the planes were difficult to deliver.  
Limitation of the aircraft’s flight range made the delivery by air problematic. The 
distance required the planes to be shipped, rather than flown, to Egypt. When the planes 
arrived at their destination, the British found them untested and improperly prepared for 
war. The American manufacturers failed to provide specifications needed for their planes 
to compete against Axis aircraft. One reason for this is American aircraft manufactures 
did not consider any input from their British counterparts during the testing of the planes. 
Britain’s aviation manufacturers took what they learned from combat and modified their 
aircraft to improve their performance. The RAF regarded American planes which did not 
live up to its standards as a hindrance.  
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Chapter 12 
The Air War in the Desert 
 
As more American planes arrived in North Africa, the Luftwaffe maintained its 
advantage over the Allies. Its air bases, situated in Italy, were much closer to Libya. 
Allied shipping routes for delivering new aircraft to this front were long and treacherous. 
Ships either threaded the needle, the narrow Strait of Gibraltar that separates Europe from 
Africa, or journeyed around the Cape of Good Hope, almost circumnavigating the 
continent of Africa before entering the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal.228
When their surface transports faced destruction in the Mediterranean, the British 
used submarines to transport supplies. These could deliver only small loads of fuel and 
ammunition. The pilots found it necessary to conserve these items, and this decreased 
their combat effectiveness.
 This led 
to long lapses between shipments. Consequently, shortages were a daily reality to 
Britain’s desert air units. 
229 Otherwise, the Desert Air Force was cut off from receiving 
equipment. Since many convoys failed to arrive, the British enlisted local seafarers to 
transport supplies.230
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 Although this makeshift solution provided a limited flow of 
supplies, it was not an adequate substitute, for their loads, too, were limited. Limited 
provisions meant improvised air bases. Under-supplied airbases in the North Africa 
provided little in the way of comfort for their personnel. Airmen stationed on Malta 
enjoyed very few amenities due also to constant Axis air strikes.  
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 RAF bases on the North African mainland featured harsh living conditions, 
including fly-infested tents baked by the desert sun. Pilots endured such hardships 
beyond fighting in the sky. Visual images of air bases in North Africa, from original 
archival photographs, show British and American outposts appearing underdeveloped in 
comparison to the more permanent Axis bases; the latter boasted paved runways and 
hangers. The former lacked concrete taxiways or parking spaces. Orderly rows of planes 
parked on the flat desert ground stand in the background, as pilots line up in formation 
for roll call. The aircraft were located some distance away from ground equipment and 
large fuel drums. This spacing was necessary, as it prevented the danger of losing the 
planes if the fuel ignited when hit.231
Due to the sand, heat, and storms, operations carried out over the desert were 
difficult. These conditions put great strains on the aircraft and the men assigned to 
maintain them. Sand entered the engines through air intakes. It transformed lubricating 
oil into a harmful paste, which caused nightmares for maintenance personnel.
 Tents dotting the sandy wasteland served as 
command headquarters, planning centers, and sleeping quarters. These meager conditions 
were among the hardships awaiting the Americans in the desert. 
232 British 
base personnel grew resourceful. Mechanics employed alternative measures to adapt 
aircraft to the harsh desert environment. They used specially designed filters to solve the 
sand menace. These filters added drag, decreasing the overall performance of the 
aircraft.233
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 Personnel found water and food in short supply in the desert. Water was 
especially valuable. It filled vehicle radiators to prevent overheating; this took priority 
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over its use for bathing.234
Malta, while not plagued by the sands of mainland North Africa, experienced 
supply shortages and inadequate base conditions. On November 14, 1942, American 
Lieutenant-General Lewis Hyde Brereton presented the first ace of the 57th group, 
Lieutenant Layman L. Middleditch, with the Distinguished Service Cross at a base on 
Malta.
  Flies infested the environment everywhere and proved a 
constant irritant to the men. The desert was extremely hot in the day and grew cold at 
night. The metal planes became incredibly hot from the scorching sun, another desert 
condition which made maintenance and handling difficult. The British air bases on Malta 
were faced with much greater severe supply shortages than those in the North African 
desert. Dire conditions prevailed, even during special events such as visits from generals 
and base inspections. 
235 The general wrote in his diary about the unusual appearance of the makeshift 
uniforms worn by the men during a formal ceremony, testifying to the difficulty of 
shipping supplies to the fighting front. Cooks used flour sacks as substitutes for aprons. 
Mechanics went shirtless due to the shortage of coveralls. Chuckling, the general also 
pointed out that toilet paper was such a scarce commodity that pilots often stuffed rolls in 
their flight suit pockets.236
These conditions grew even more unbearable when Allied soldiers discovered that 
American equipment was ineffective. Through the Lend Lease agreement, and later, 
during American deployment in TORCH, the British rushed untested American weapons 
 The aviators and ground crews of the RAF learned to cope 
with these extremes and, enduring these hardships, grew tougher and more resourceful. 
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and equipment to the battlefront with disastrous results. Beyond flawed airplanes, 
American sent tanks to the British, including M4 Shermans. This vehicle often proved to 
be a death trap up against German Tiger tanks and the 88 flack gun that Rommel used to 
great effect as an antitank weapon. The medium tank Sherman was, nonetheless, a 
significant improvement over other American tanks supplied to the British, Grant and 
Lee armored fighting vehicles. However, the Sherman’s medium armor was highly 
vulnerable.237 The American War Department rushed this tank into production, with its 
74-mm main gun mounted on a rotating turret.238 According to historian Rick Atkinson, 
the Sherman’s shell failed to puncture the armor of the German Tiger tank even at point 
blank range, while the Tiger’s larger round could easily ignite the Sherman tank’s 
ammunition stores from a range of over a mile.239 In February 1943, Rommel’s panzers 
devastated American armor at Kasserine Pass.240 In just two weeks at the front in Tunisia, 
American units lost a total of one hundred twenty-four tanks.241
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 This pattern held true as 
well for some of the American aircraft used in the North African campaign. The British 
knew that their desert models of the Hawker Hurricane and the Supermarine Spitfire 
matched or outclassed most German planes, and the RAF pilots preferred these over 
American aircraft. After learning of their ineffectiveness the RAF noted concerns about 
receiving American manufactured planes. British commanders understood that 
inexperienced American pilots flying technically inferior aircraft invited disaster. Britain 
nonetheless welcomed their assistance. When America entered the war in December 
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1941, the British eagerly anticipated fuller assistance. Although America sent obsolete 
aircraft and novice pilots, war-weary British forces needed such manpower and additional 
resources.  
London faced a difficult dilemma in deciding how to best utilize the incoming 
American air units. The British feared that America deployed its air elements abroad 
regardless of their state of readiness. Most American units allocated for deployment 
lacked a requisite level of training and preparation. In order to compensate for American 
deficiencies, the British planned for American bombing units to attack ports thought to 
offer minimal resistance. Vichy French forces defended these ports. Meanwhile, the 
Allied command tasked the RAF units to confront battle-hardened German forces 
deployed in the east. The RAF, having proven itself in Malta and North Africa, was 
capable of carrying out such missions with lower losses then the untested American air 
units. While the British held strongly to their belief that American pilots received poor 
training and were, in late 1942, ill-suited for combat, the RAF needed assistance to mount 
efforts against the Axis in North Africa and the Western Mediterranean. Washington did 
not agree with the British that the Allies should focus their efforts on North Africa. 
Roosevelt and his military leaders, General George Marshall and Admiral Ernest King 
preferred an early assault on Nazi-occupied France. This hampered the planning process, 
as Churchill and his commanders sought to convince the Americans that this was 
premature in 1942. 
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Chapter 13 
Operation TORCH 
 
Winston Churchill met with President Franklin Roosevelt in Washington, D.C., at 
the ARCADIA Conference in late December of 1941 to discuss Allied war strategy. 
Churchill explained the advantages of waging a North African campaign to the other 
leaders.242 The American military leaders, hesitant to commit forces to North Africa, 
viewed the area as having far less strategic importance than Europe. Africa seemed to 
them an illogical military objective; the Americans labeled it a side show. While 
American leaders wanted to liberate Europe quickly by first directly assaulting Hitler’s 
Atlantic defenses on the French coast, Churchill aimed to protect Britain’s imperial 
interests in Egypt, Gibraltar, and Malta. He argued that the best way to get into Europe 
was through the “soft underbelly” of Italy. His primary defensive goal was to prevent 
Hitler from obtaining Middle East oil. The British firmly believed that the Allies should 
not yet assault the West European mainland due to the Luftwaffe’s control of the 
European skies. Also, the British regarded Hitler’s coastal defenses as too strong to 
overcome, and believed that the Western Allies lacked the experience, strength and 
equipment to undertake a successful invasion along the French Atlantic coast.243
Churchill believed that operations in North Africa could serve as a suitable 
opportunity for American troops to gain combat experience. This rationale extended to 
pilots, because North Africa, unlike the European mainland, with its relative absence of 
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anti-aircraft units, seemed a more suitable field of operation for newly trained pilots. In 
addition, waging a North African campaign from both west and east provided the 
possibility of cornering the Afrika Korps in Tunisia, once Anglo-American troops landed 
on the Maghreb’s opposite side in Morocco. This projected operation developed into 
Operation TORCH, a sizable Anglo-American invasion of northwest Africa scheduled to 
begin on November 8, 1942. Admiral Andrew Cunningham knew that the under-trained 
American units lacked the preparation necessary to be successful in the onset of the full 
scale operation that faced them. Nonetheless, he believed in the importance of acting 
without delay, in spite of their deficiencies. He stressed the importance of swift action for 
the success of the operation as a whole. Action had to be taken quickly in order to trap 
the Germans and Italians. Samuel Elliot Morison cited Admiral Cunningham’s written 
response to his direct feeling and position on this matter:244
No officer commanding a unit will ever be satisfied that he has had adequate 
preparation and training until his unit is trained and equipped down to the last 
gaiter button. There are times in history when we can not afford to wait for the 
final polish. I suggest that it should be made widely known to all units that for 
“TORCH” particularly we could not afford to wait, and that the risk of embarking 
on these large-scale operations with inadequate training was deliberately 
accepted, in order to strike while the time was ripe. We must now push forward 
our training so that such a situation can not again arise.
 
245
Andrew Cunningham made an important point: the state of improperly trained and 
unprepared American units demanded British assistance. Throughout the fighting, 
Admiral Cunningham assumed that the American air forces would improve through 
combat. He deemed such war experience as the most effective way for unprepared 
American forces to learn how to fight. The operations could not be postponed past 
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November, for winter conditions on the beachheads would then prohibit them. Suitable 
weather would not resume until the following year.246
Preceding the TORCH landings in French Morocco, Oran, and Algiers, the Allied 
command agreed to assign the United States Army’s Twelfth Air Force and groups of 
American carrier-based naval aircraft to provide cover over the invasion beaches and 
assist the seizure of airfields. This was the initial phase of a highly complex operation 
involving the Anglo-American allies.
 This meant that the Allies had to 
launch the operation in November regardless of how inexperienced and unprepared the 
Americans were for combat. 
247 When planning TORCH, American generals 
decided which American air units to assign to cover specific landing areas. General 
James Doolittle took aerial command of the Casablanca area. He requested air support 
from the 33rd Fighter Group, a unit of P-40s thought to be sufficient to achieve local air 
superiority when combined with naval fighters.248
In preparation for Operation TORCH, the Allies positioned their land aircraft and 
aircraft carriers in designated areas. By September of 1942, the Twelfth Air Force, 
commanded by Doolittle, assumed control of two newly arrived American P-38 
groups.
 While General Doolittle projected 
confidence in America’s untested airmen, he planned for the unexpected by employing 
significantly more pilots than required by the operation. This overcompensation gave his 
green pilots a numerical advantage over their opponents.  
249
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 These planes flew from Britain nonstop to Gibraltar following a meandering 
route around Iberia, due to the political complexities of Spain’s neutrality. This lengthy, 
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twelve hundred mile journey to the operations deployment area demonstrated the sheer, 
long-range capabilities of this exceptional fighter.250 In order to make this arduous trip, 
each aircraft carried two 165 gallon fuel tanks to extend its range. According to the 
maintenance and operation manual, installing the tanks was a fairly simple and straight 
forward procedure. Each tank attached directly to the plane’s underbelly.251 Other 
American fighters, the P-39s and P-40s, required the use of drop tanks to make the long 
trip. Following the arrival of the P-38 Lightnings, one hundred twenty-five Bell P-39 Air 
Cobras flew to Gibraltar. Later, P-40s flew to the same deployment area to assist in 
attacks on the ports targeted during Operation TORCH.252
American units involved in Operation TORCH faced, initially, not Germans or 
Italians, but Vichy French opponents. This unlikely circumstance derived from both the   
soured relations between the French and British at this time and the control of the Vichy 
 American air commanders 
rushed planes overseas to England and other staging areas for use in Operation Torch and 
subsequent action during the North African campaign. The biggest question was how 
American aircraft would measure up in combat against the Luftwaffe. With green pilots, 
the full potential of the aircraft would remain unknown until engaged in actual battles.  
Due to problems they faced using American aircraft through the Lend Lease, the 
RAF already depreciated American hardware. Lend Lease planes gained a bad reputation 
with British mechanics. Foreign mechanical construction and layout of instrumentation of 
the American aircraft confused British pilots and lessened their performance when flown 
by RAF pilots.  
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regime over French military units in North Africa. The latter sympathized and/or 
collaborated with the Nazis. In a series of miscommunication and distrust, a violent 
incident destroyed the earlier fragile partnership between England and France. In 
“Operation Catapult,” an attempt to prevent the French fleet from falling into German 
hands, a British fleet on June 20, 1940, opened fire on French naval units stationed at 
Mers-el-Kebir on the Algerian coast. This unfortunate clash resulted in the destruction of 
this French fleet.253 Most seriously, the operation resulted in 1,297 dead and 354 
wounded French sailors.254
At first, the green American air units without the aid of the RAF experienced 
great difficulty facing the French pilots. The American air units’ level of training caused 
frequent preventable accidents during the initial phase of the TORCH air operations. 
These air operations succeeded only because of superior Allied numbers in aircraft over 
those of the French defenders. The TORCH air operations plan issued on September 20, 
1942, required the American Twelfth Air Force to attack the widely separated Vichy-held 
ports of Casablanca and Oran in preparation for the invasion. Dividing the air support 
weakened the operation. Military historian Wesley Craven argued that the Allied decision 
 This event so poisoned French-British relations that it 
compelled the Allies to send American units to invade French-controlled regions of North 
Africa. Mers-el-Kebir discouraged the British from undertaking further action against the 
French, providing an opportunity for green American forces to face an opponent less 
proficient and determined than the Afrika Korps. The Allies assigned these areas to 
American air units; they were the obvious choice to face the anti-British Vichy French, 
who as yet held no grudge against the Americans.  
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to split the air commands into two groups, each with its commander and operating in 
different target areas, segregated and diluted their strength and impact.255
Air Marshal Sir William Welsh and General Doolittle headed the separate Allied 
air commands. Welsh took charge of the Eastern Air Command (E.A.C.), which included 
RAF air units commissioned to assist in the attack on Algiers and Tunis. The British 
E.A.C. provided air support for the operation to seize Algiers and move towards Tunis, 
involving the capture of the harbors of Bougie, Philippeville, and Bone.
 The divided air 
command encountered trouble in coordinating air operations. Furthermore, the unified 
naval command could not successfully communicate to both air commands. 
256  The Western 
Air Command, consisting of the American Twelfth Air Force and naval air units, 
concentrated on supporting of the landings at Oran and Casablanca. General Doolittle 
brought his Twelfth Air Force into the Western Air Command. It was three times larger 
than the E.A.C.: the Twelfth Air Force consisted of 1,244 aircraft, while the E.A.C. 
contained only 454 planes.257 The planners realized it would be more effective to use the 
navy’s carrier aircraft to provide initial support for the landings rather than relying on 
naval bombardment alone. The American naval aircraft would be the initial air assets 
committed until secured coastal aerodromes permitted for the Twelfth Air Force and the 
E.A.C. to take over.258
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 The tasks assigned to the naval planes included clearing the skies 
of enemy fighters and strafing enemy airfields to expedite advances by the ground forces. 
Use of the carriers created a distinct advantage for the Allies. Aircraft returned to the 
carriers when they finished their mission, unlike land-based planes. The French- 
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controlled landing areas needed to be secured by ground units before land-based fighters 
could operate in North Africa. 
As attack plans developed, American logistical mishaps threatened to undermine 
the success of the operation. Shortages of aviation fuel, ammunition, oil, and spare parts 
kept planes operating. American commanders, unfamiliar with the logistics of managing 
air units, committed grave mistakes by allocating resources disproportionate to the forces 
attached to Operation TORCH. Command expected the American Twelfth Air Force to 
receive supplies from the Eighth Air Force Service Command. Failure at this made 
creation of its own service command necessary. This seriously depleted the Eighth Air 
Force’s resources, leaving it undersupplied for the operation.259 The Eighth Air Force 
reported that it lost at least seventy-five percent of its supplies to the Twelfth Air 
Force.260 The British developed a more efficient method of allocating resources to each 
unit with its own built-in control, preventing resources from being taken away from their 
respected units without direct orders from command.261
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Chapter 14 
American Baptism by Fire 
 
The Twelfth Air Force played a restricted role in the TORCH landings. Its air 
units involved the initial heaviest fighting included the 97th and 301st Groups. These 
consisted of American bombers escorted by P-38 Lightnings of the 1st and 4th Fighter 
Groups, and Spitfires of the British 31st and 52nd Groups.262
The Wildcats attacked the coasts over Casablanca on the morning of November 8, 
1942. 
 Navy Wildcats engaged in 
the majority of the air combat. The Navy assigned its Wildcats to provide air cover for 
the American landings and to neutralize enemy airfields in anticipation of the arrival of 
American ground troops. Once secured, these airfields would host the planes of the 
Twelfth Air Force.  
263  To the east the British feared that the Germans would commandeer the French 
warships based in Algeria. At Oran, French forces counterattacked with fifty-five 
Dewointine 520s launched from La Senia.264 The French D.520 flew at a maximum 
speed of 332 mph (534 km/hr), slightly faster than the American F4F Wildcat’s top speed 
of 318 mph.265 The air station at Port Lyautey, Morocco, held twenty-five Dewoitine 
520’s and eleven Martin 167 French bombers. Twenty-three French fighters stationed at 
Casablanca threatened the American landing forces.266
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The RAF commanders regarded the French air force as a lesser threat than the 
Italians and assumed the green American pilots would be able to defeat it. American 
pilots struggled when fighting the French in their initial baptism of fire. The Wildcats 
arrived and met Vichy resistance. The Vichy French air strength in Morocco totaled 
around two hundred aircraft, distributed among seven airfields. American sources, pilot 
diaries, and after action repots, described the resultant air battles. One pilot, Ed Seiler, 
flew a Wildcat protecting the Allied landings.267 During his first combat sortie, he 
engaged multiple French fighters over Casablanca. His flight of Wildcats managed to 
silence gun batteries shelling the landing forces. While doing so, they came under attack 
by five French fighters. The Wildcats could outmaneuver, but not outrun, Dewoitine 520 
fighters.268 The American planes’ payload of heavy bombs impeded their performance by 
slowing them down; their ordinances also rendered them less maneuverable.269 
Nevertheless, on this mission, the Americans managed to shoot down two French planes. 
As the battle raged in the sky over the beaches, French bombers flew out to sea to 
threaten the American armada. Wildcats flying combat air patrol noticed the danger and 
destroyed the bombers before they could threaten the US carriers, destroyers, support 
ships, and transports.270
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 The American naval fighters, early in the operation, also 
eliminated a number of French aircraft and cleared the enemy airfields from threats to the 
Allied forces.  
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Attacking the French Moroccan airfields proved to be more difficult than 
anticipated. During their attack on Cazes airdrome in Casablanca on November 8, 
American Navy Wildcats encountered tough aerial resistance from Vichy aircraft, 
including D.520s and imported P-36s.271 The Dewoitine 520s, grouped in formation to 
challenge the Allied aircraft. The American planes destroyed other French planes, those 
caught on the ground, in strafing attacks.272 Out of 1420 rounds of ammunition loaded 
onto each of the Wildcats before battle, the trigger sensitive green American pilots fired 
an average of 904 rounds, yet scored few hits on their targets.273 One of the French planes 
shot down Lieutenant Charles A. Shields; he opened his canopy and bailed out. As he 
parachuted from his Wildcat, French ground forces fired on him.  He replied with his 
pistol.274
Widespread instances of catastrophic navigational error occurred during TORCH.  
Lieutenant Ernest, Wood Jr., flew his Wildcat over the coastline and engaged the French 
under of the cover of his wingman, Ensign Andrew B. Conner, Jr. The pair tackled a 
large force of Dewoitine 520s and utilized evasive maneuvers they had learned in 
training. They managed to shoot down one French plane, but Ensign Conner got lost due 
to his lack of navigational skills. He ran out of fuel searching for his aircraft carrier. 
 The Americans also suffered casualties from friendly fire, undeveloped 
navigational skills, and unfamiliarity with aircraft handling and maneuvers.  
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Ensign Braun also could not navigate back to the ship and just as Ensign Conner did, 
ditched his Wildcat in the Atlantic.275
Another example of American mishaps occurred when Squadron Air Group 29 
lost an entire flight of four planes from both mechanical failure and navigational 
miscalculations.  More experienced American pilots suffered mechanical failures due to 
mistakes made by haphazard ground crew preparation and a lack on their part of 
preventative and reactive malfunction remedy procedures. Lieutenant George Trumpter 
broke away from combat due to failing oil pressure and disappeared. The Squadron 
leader, Lieutenant Commander John T. Black, experienced trouble during takeoff with 
broken landing gear, yet flew his mission. When he attained a critical fuel level he turned 
back, abandoning the rest of his flight. Lack of fuel and broken undercarriages forced the 
rookie ensigns who filled Black’s formation to ditch in the Atlantic.
  
276 This cost the 
carrier four undamaged aircraft. The four remaining green pilots failed to locate their 
carrier, USS Santee, due to their limited navigational skills. Without their flight leaders, 
their situation was hopeless. Their rushed training ignored or overlooked rudimentary 
skills involving navigating back to their carrier. Many had to ditch. Lt. Hammond 
Cassidy, Andres Bold and Ensign Ball experienced problems and landed at the USS 
Suwannee because they lacked sufficient fuel to fly to their assigned carrier. This 
example of poor fuel management is one of many indicators of deficient American 
training.277
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 Improper training, inexperience, and faulty equipment led to the widespread 
accidents and problems among American air units during Operation TORCH.  
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The pilots encountered difficulties apart from navigation. Lt. Hammond Cassidy, 
Andres Bold and Ensign Ball mismanaged their fuel consumption and landed at the USS 
Suwannee instead of flying the additional distance to their assigned carrier. This further 
example of failed fuel management is one of the indicators of the grave effects of the 
incomplete American training program on rookie American airmen during TORCH.278 
Two planes crashed during takeoff on the USS Santee. Even more precarious than 
takeoffs, carrier landings presented pilots with their biggest challenge. One F4F 
attempting to land approached at a dangerous angle and crashed into the deck. The 
impact ripped apart the plane’s tail section. The pilot had very little experience landing 
on carrier decks during his training. Such mishaps, caused by American airmen’s 
misjudgment and undeveloped skills, reduced the Santee to nine remaining working 
aircraft from its initial complement of thirty.279
These American pilots who engaged the French developed specific perceptions 
about this enemy. They described the Vichy pilots as prideful, yet chivalrous. For 
example, two Wildcats ended up in the ocean because of their pilots’ misjudgment in 
combat maneuvers and or high probability to commit friendly fire or mid air collision. 
The loss of the two wing men allowed for a French Dewoitine 520 to shoot down 
Lieutenant Wood. As the bullets ripped apart the oil cooler lines, his plane began to 
descend towards the blue water. As Wood struggled with the dying plane, he looked to 
his right and glimpsed what he perceived as a French pilot gloating over his victory. He 
could see the Frenchman grinning wildly and waving as his plane tumbled towards the 
sea. Wood’s plane hit the water hard. He squeezed out, inflating his “Mae West” flotation 
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device.280
Despite the setbacks and casualties suffered by the Wildcat units, American pilots 
achieved some success. On November 8, the American Wildcat Unit VF-41 claimed 
thirteen aerial kills, also one probable. In addition, they destroyed six enemy planes, and 
damaged eight on the Cazes airfield.
 Once pilots ditched in the water, the Navy attempted to recover them. 
Destroyers, submarines, and other friendly vessels rescued a number of downed airmen.   
281
Even though the Americans remained the designated force against the Vichy 
French, some British units engaged the French defenders of their North African ports. 
The RAF in TORCH performed much better than the Americans. Although they suffered 
losses, they neutralized the Vichy airfields more efficiently. They did, however, make 
mistakes since they had trained to fight specifically German aircraft and needed 
experience to understand and overcome French planes and tactics. In one instance, pilots 
of four Spitfires mistook French planes for Hurricanes at Tafaroui airfield. They wrongly 
assumed that this airfield was under British control. As the Spitfires prepared to land, 
they encountered four Dewoitines. These French planes attacked and brought down one 
of the Spitfires, killing its pilot. The other Spitfires reacted by shooting down the three 
remaining Dewoitines.
 Due to the inexperience of the American Navy 
pilots, the cost was heavy, as seven Wildcats were shot down. Three additional planes 
went missing under unknown circumstances.  
282 The group of Spitfires easily destroyed a column of French 
Foreign Legion light tanks with their 20mm cannon, obliterating these targets.283
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British pilots utilized their knowledge of air and ground battle tactics to quickly 
neutralize the airfield, while suffering only the one loss.  
Although the Twelfth Air Force played a minimal role in the assault phase of 
Operation TORCH, it introduced American pilots to combat. On November 11, the 
carrier operations ended with a ceasefire, as the local Vichy French command capitulated. 
The difficulties that America’s naval fighter plane operation experienced paled in 
comparison with the absolute failure the experimental air observation post program 
endured. In a severe case of friendly fire, the American naval ships in the TORCH 
invasion armada almost completely destroyed a group of American light reconnaissance 
aircraft by “friendly fire.”  
The Western Task Force, commanded by Major-General George S. Patton, Jr., 
covered the Moroccan coastal invasion. Patton assigned unarmed, forward observer L-4 
planes to coordinate his artillery fire. Launched from the deck of the USS Ranger, these 
planes attempted to provide guidance for direct fire support from the air for the ground 
divisions moving into Casablanca.284 The L-4’s wood construction rendered it highly 
vulnerable. The slow, single engine L-4s had a similar construction to the civilian Piper 
Cub model.285 In preparation for the invasion, the American Navy packed these planes in 
crates on board an aircraft carrier so quickly that the pilots and crews were unable to 
examine them in training, let alone fly them.286
The unusual appearance of these light aircraft confused the U.S. Navy. The L-4 
planes did not appear in the Navy’s airplane identification recognition books, and naval 
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gunners never viewed them prior to the TORCH landings. Consequently, many L-4s fell 
victim to friendly fire during TORCH. On November 9, at 14:25, the light cruiser USS 
Brooklyn failed to identify three L-4 observation planes and opened fire on them.287 Soon 
the entire fleet in the area opened fire, with its 20mm antiaircraft gun. One airplane took a 
direct hit, and the round pierced its pilot’s leg. It spun out of control and crashed on the 
coast, bursting into flames after the pilot made a successful escape by bailing out and 
parachuting into the ocean.288
 American carrier-borne aircraft from the Santee attacked an airfield at 
Casablanca. Before Operation TORCH, these American carrier pilots failed to log the 
minimum requirement of two hundred hours of training in the F4F Wildcat. Even worse, 
some had conducted only twenty-five carrier landings far short from the usual fifty.
 The two other planes were damaged and crash landed 
behind enemy lines. The Vichy French captured the downed pilots. Unaware of their 
existence and silhouette, the naval gunners had assumed the L-4s were hostile.  
289 
Others in the group had accomplished only eighteen carrier landings on the carrier 
Santee. At sea, they spent the last two weeks before the battle not flying.290
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 Despite their 
pilots’ insufficient flight training, the Wildcats successfully assisted the ground forces in 
capturing the airfield by clearing the air threats strafing ground defenses and parked 
aircraft. As a whole, the flight of Wildcats managed to destroy eight of ten French aircraft 
on the ground, in addition to setting fire to the surrounding hangers. They, however, 
failed to conserve fuel. Although their commanders instructed them to return to the 
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carrier once their fuel dropped below the minimum level, the airmen ran their fuel tanks 
so low that they had no choice but to land on the airbase they had just attacked.  
The Army Air Corps fared no better, as it suffered great losses due to mishaps. 
According to the American after action reports of the 33rd Fighter Group, accidents 
occurred frequently during the operations on November 8th and 9th. These documents 
reveal that the 58th, 59th, and 60th groups lost a total of twenty-seven aircraft during the 
initial stage of the operation.291 Pilot error was attributed to eight of these recorded 
losses. In specific individual report accounts, the pilots blamed the loss of their aircraft to 
unsatisfactory runway conditions. In contrast, five Navy Wildcats piloted by more 
experienced aviators touched down safely on the same airfield.292 The pilots taxied their 
planes over to the enemy’s fuel depot to gas up. During takeoff, however, three of the 
five planes crashed.293 Carrier pilots normally took off assisted by a head wind, with their 
ship turned into the wind before launch, negating the need for a cross wind takeoff. This 
was another example of rushed and incomplete training taking its toll. Non-combat 
casualties far exceeded those caused in combat by the enemy. Operational losses 
accounted for twenty-three Wildcats on the first day of TORCH, with more losses 
following during the operation.294
Many Americans were so eager to fight and proud that they flew sorties in 
formations consisting entirely of inexperienced pilots. By late November, only half of the 
American planes in North Africa were air worthy; nearly half of the Allied planes lost in 
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North Africa were due to crashes and accidents caused by pilot error.295 According to an 
article in Yank, the Army Weekly, American aviation training accidents often occurred. It 
revealed that General Henry H. Arnold, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Air 
Force, admitted this. Due to the need for secrecy, he had not revealed the full extent of 
these mishaps. Instead, he conveyed to the press a mythical figure that claimed a 
decreased training accident rate: ninety-five out of one hundred pilots, he asserted, 
completed their twelve months of aerial training unharmed.296 In Army at Dawn, Rick 
Atkinson described the Allied Air command as “disorganized, poorly coordinated, and 
split by rivalry and national chauvinism.”297
American pilots did not share the level of exposure of RAF aviators. The British 
had endured and survived years of war while America remained neutral. The Americans 
did not replicate the same level of proficiency and familiarity of the battle-tested British 
aviators. To the fresh American pilots, war was an unknown, often either frightening or 
romanticized. Since they had yet to experience combat, no coping mechanisms were in 
place to deal with the emotional trauma of warfare. A few of the new Wildcat pilots 
appeared fearful when entering combat against the Vichy French. One of these, 
  
Elsewhere, the RAF tried to ease the American pilots into combat by inserting a 
few of them into unit flights of British aircraft. The British felt that the American Air 
Forces diluted the strength of their battle-tested and effective Desert Air Force air arm as 
the two forces integrated. The common British perception of their American counterparts 
included such adjectives as “inexperienced,” “overconfident,” and “stubborn.” 
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Lieutenant (J.G.) Charles Shields, confessed to the other pilots in his flight, “Gosh, I’ll 
never forget the fright I had when those Vichy boys were peppering me, and I could hear 
the bullets smacking against the armor plate, a decidedly insalubrious experience.”298
Pilot mistakes continued to plague the American air arm. The Twelfth Air Force 
suffered many wrecks due to pilot error during Operation TORCH. On November 10, 
1942, the US Naval escort carrier the Chenango launched 78 AAF P-40s to commence 
air operations from the newly acquired air field at Port Lyautey, Morocco.
 
Insufficient training left American pilots mentally unprepared for combat.  
299 Seventeen 
American P-40s out of a group of fifty-eight crashed while attempting to land on their 
airfield, located near Casablanca, on November 10, 1942.300 This group lost another 
plane the next day, also from a failed landing. These mishaps were attributed to pilot 
inexperience.301 On the same day the Army Air Corps attempted to launch P-40s from an 
American carrier with disastrous results.302 Out of the seventy-seven planes of the 59th 
Squadron ordered to fly to Port Lyautey, two crashed on take-off and one simply 
vanished.303
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 The British regarded many of the American P-40 pilots as too green for 
dogfights; instead these pilots received simpler assignments, such as strafing runs. These 
missions called for attacks on enemy trucks, roads, bridges, railroads, supply dumps, and 
gun emplacements. While these tasks presented less risk than engaging enemy fighters, 
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they too generated casualties. Colonel Peter McGoldrick died during one of these lower 
risk assignments.304
Although under-training contributed greatly to American air arm casualties, 
equipment was also to blame. The aircraft in America’s arsenal in late 1942 were 
unsuited for combat against the Luftwaffe. The underpowered P-40 and the untested P-38 
Lightning were the signature aircraft flown in late 1942 by the American Twelfth and 
Fifteenth Air Forces. The P-40 Warhawk could not compete with the latest version of the 
Messerschmitt BF-109. P-40 pilot Colonel Baseler commented: “A P-40 couldn’t outrun 
a Messerschmitt, couldn’t out-climb one, so you got bloody old having to wait for the 
other guy to get tired before you could go home.”
  
305
After ground troops captured enemy airfields under the cover of naval fighter 
aircraft, the Army Air Corps moved in. The achievements and performance of the 
American Twelfth Air Force in the official AAF Guide are highly inflated and 
misleading. This primary source exaggerates the effectiveness of the Twelfth Air Force. 
It claims that the Twelfth Air Force played a decisive role in relieving the dangerous 
situation at Kasserine Pass. In fact, while Rommel’s veterans slaughtered American 
forces in the February 1943 Battle of Kasserine Pass, the Air Force played no useful 
role.
 These shortcomings presented 
American pilots with a challenging learning curve before new and better performing 
aircraft came into service.  
306
                                                 
304 Ernest R. McDowell. The P-40 Kittyhawk (New York: Arco Publishing, 1968), 18. 
305 McDowell, 20.  
306 Official AAF Guide, 287.  
 The official AAF guide indicates that there was an inherently biased view to 
portray the American air units in a positive light. The document further claims that, in a 
three month period starting in November of 1942, the Twelfth Air Force destroyed more 
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than four hundred enemy planes.307 Their total operations, in combination with the 
Fifteenth Air Force, ranging from November 1942 to March 1, 1944, included 199,179 
total sorties flown. On these missions, Allied planes dropped 106,567 tons of bombs. The 
two air forces lost 1,473 planes in aerial combat while allegedly shooting down 2,959 
enemy planes.308
Contemporary records purposefully manipulated numbers to record a ratio of 
more enemy planes destroyed than American losses. When this evidence is contrasted 
with primary documents, we see a much different picture. The pilots over-inflated 
numbers by including claims of probable kills and exaggerations. The list of planes lost 
does not entirely explain the cause of these casualties. As revealed in the diaries of both 
American naval and air corps pilots, inexperience or mechanical failure directly 
contributed to the loss of many American planes.
 The government manipulated and inflated these numbers by including 
probable and suspected kills in the totals. It also omitted the cases of airplane losses 
attributed to mishaps and accidents, which distorted their statistics. The accounts of 
losses from primary journals reveal the number of casualties were far greater than 
portrayed in the official records.  
309 Many pilots, unable to find their 
carriers, ran out of fuel and ditched their planes in the ocean. The escort carrier Santee 
alone lost six aircraft due to mishaps and more to others reducing its fighter force to nine 
operational aircraft.310
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  Other pilots crashed into carrier decks, damaging or destroying 
their aircraft. These losses contributed to American setbacks. Accidents related to 
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inadequate training and pilot error continued to plague American pilots of the Army Air 
Corps and the Navy after the North Africa invasion.  
On November 14, 1942, headquarters tasked a squadron made up of twelve 
American P-40Fs to assist a ground attack on Rabat. The squadron consisted of J 
Squadron replacements that lacked any combat experience. Second Lieutenant Marvin 
Carpenter, one of the P-40 pilots, got separated from his squadron and, due probably to 
his insufficient navigational training, never returned to base.311 On November 19, eleven 
days after the initial invasion, Second Lt. Kenneth R. Smith died when he crashed his 
damaged P-40 Wildcat after colliding in the air with a fellow countryman, whose pilot’s 
plane luckily survived.312
Beyond America’s unpreparedness in flight training, air tactical doctrine was so 
seriously flawed that American fighter planes provided little support to ground units. 
However, the mere sight of airplanes over the battlefield increased morale among ground 
units. As long as the troops recognized planes bearing their country’s markings flying 
overhead, they drew comfort. Often, however, these planes were on reconnaissance 
missions.
 The American Air Forces did not immediately record these 
numbers because losses that resulted from accidents reflected negatively on the naval air 
arm’s reputation, and they deemed such losses unrelated to combat. This information 
further the illustrates American air units’ unpreparedness for combat and its excessive 
numbers of accidents and losses.  
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 The RAF conducted an offensive air campaign over Libya in late 1942 that 
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crippled Axis forward ground positions. This cleared the way for the British 8th Army.314
 Air coverage almost remained non-existent for the American ground troops in the 
desert. United States air units often failed to coordinate with ground units. American 
troops landing on the eastern beaches of French Algeria in Operation TORCH dealt with 
German aircraft after they moved toward Tunisia. German dive bombers constantly 
tormented American ground troops. When friendly aircraft appeared over American 
troops at Medjez-el-Bab, a major instance of “friendly fire” occurred. The battered 
company of American tank destroyers at first welcomed the sight of eleven twin-boomed 
P-38 Lightnings at first, until their pilots swooped down and executed five strafing runs, 
almost completely destroying the unit. The strike killed five solders and wounded sixteen. 
It obliterated most of the company’s vehicles and antitank weapons.
 
In contrast, American air support for the ground units often failed to materialize. On the 
rare occasions when planes did support ground troops, they sometimes mistook friendly 
troops for the enemy. 
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 The pilots flying 
the Lightnings failed to recognize their own troops, even though the soldiers gleefully 
waved and cheered from the ground. A properly trained and experienced pilot could 
identify the silhouettes of his own nation’s tanks and equipments. Again, American pilots 
lacked this knowledge. As the ground units advanced against the enemy, they expected 
support from coordinated allied air cover. Tragically, American pilots failed to coordinate 
with these ground forces. The Stuka, an aircraft highly vulnerable to enemy fighters 
attacked Allied ground units unopposed.  
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The number of American accidents and cases of friendly fire continued to 
increase during the North African campaign. On February 3, 1943, American planes 
bombed the United States’ supply train at Sened Station in Tunisia. Based on this 
incident, British Air commanders commented in disgust that American pilots proved to 
be both poor map readers and ineffective bombers. Not only did the American pilots 
mistakenly strike their friendly target, their aim was so inaccurate that they missed by 
five hundred yards.316
American air units made many mistakes during Operation TORCH. They failed to 
coordinate their efforts with those of the land forces. In contrast, the British understood 
the importance of communication and cooperation between army and air units. British 
Army generals visited RAF bases to ensure that base commanders were effectively 
providing cover for ground troops. The army required the RAF to perform 
reconnaissance missions over forward enemy positions, provide tactical air support, and 
attack enemy supply lines. The commander of the British Eighth Army possessed the 
authority to command air missions. On November 26, 1941, the Eighth Army’s 
commanding general, General Cunningham, tasked RAF’s No. 451 Squadron to strike 
targets.
 These continuing incidents underscored the United States Army 
Air Force’s poor state of preparedness for the campaign. Mistakes resulting so frequently 
from inadequate training and other factors cost American lives and hampered Allied 
efforts.  
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 RAF commanders, in conjunction with the Army generals, designed sorties in 
North Africa to help the army. As experts analyzed photographs of the target areas of 
interest, they provided feedback to the RAF. This method proved effective in the desert.  
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The dangers and suffering associated with war shocked many ill-equipped, green 
American pilots. Fates of downed pilots included burning to death, stranding in the 
desert, or drowning in the Mediterranean.  Atkinson recognized that the poor 
performance of American servicemen in Operation TORCH called for a response by 
Allied leaders. Eisenhower acknowledged this situation and unified his administration 
towards a common goal: compensating for casualties and clearly executing the agreed 
directive.318
According to Eisenhower, TORCH provided a learning experience as well as a 
baptism by fire for American airmen. Eisenhower reflected on this when he wrote: 
“TORCH revealed profound shortcomings in leadership, tactics, equipment, martial élan, 
and common sense.”
 Operation TORCH and the subsequent fight in eastern Algeria and Tunisia 
gave American pilots the opportunity to learn from their mistakes and adapt new 
techniques and skills. The performance of the American air forces parallels Rick 
Atkinson’s negative assessment of the ground units’ shortcomings in Operation TORCH. 
Poor training and inexperience led American air and ground units to perform poorly in 
Operation TORCH. Inadequate equipment contributed to this. The American army 
outfitted units with lightly armored outdated tanks, and the Air Corps flew underpowered 
aircraft. American tanks and anti-tank guns could not easily penetrate enemy armor with 
their shells, and most American aircraft could be easily outmaneuvered and overtaken by 
enemy fighters. In addition to insufficient equipment, troops and pilots suffered from 
inadequate training.  
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 His words revealed the truth of the situation. The American 
military entered TORCH severely unprepared and poorly organized. American 
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coordination and use of air power did not the meet expectations of the Allied Command. 
The American generals radically overhauled their tactics and relations between air and 
ground forces based on lessons they learned from TORCH. General Hap Arnold 
established a new air doctrine of tactics derived from the mistakes and lessons of 
TORCH. In his Field Manual 100-20, published on July 21, 1943, he stated the basic 
principle that land and air power existed as co-equal independent forces. He stressed the 
importance of achieving air superiority, as it played an important role in protecting 
ground forces.320
 Britain and America recognized the importance of Allied cooperation and their 
leaders discussed methods for future improvement. During Operation TORCH, the 
British and American air units and commands failed to work together. America’s 
attempts at aerial reconnaissance and air artillery observation largely failed. 
Communication during TORCH was erratic and slow. To remedy this problem, the 
Americans applied the wireless telegraph to the battlefield.
 
321
 Due to their usefulness in the desert, the fighter bombers played a key role. The 
planes had the capability of attacking enemy airfields as well as enemy fighters. In order 
to achieve effective use of its fighter bombers, command needed to employ battle trained 
pilots. The Allies found strafing attacks to be costly due to exposure to ground fire, as 
well as the higher a probability of collision at such low altitudes. After their initial 
landings in Northwest Africa, the Allies depended on their air power to push into Tunisia. 
The Twelfth Air Force suffered 2,000 aircrew casualties in the Tunisian campaign, which 
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began on November 12, 1942, and ended on May 13, 1943.322 These numbers included 
404 pilots killed, 423 wounded, and 1,173 captured or missing throughout the campaign. 
American land forces suffered 11,984 casualties, with 1,986 soldiers killed.323
Combat usually developed survival instincts and tactics in the pilots, traits 
unobtainable any other way. After Operation TORCH, air operations continued in the 
desert, and American pilots gained experience. Even so, they still required British 
assistance. In Cairo, on June 11, 1943, Air Chief Marshal Tedder ordered three more 
American air groups to join the Ninth Air Force. The RAF deployed six additional flights 
to patrol the area to add security for the American 9th Air Force.
  
324 The British strongly 
believed that the Americans needed extra support, as evidenced by their poor 
performance in Operation TORCH. General Dwight D. Eisenhower hoped exposure to 
combat would develop the fighting spirit of American ground troops and pilots.325
These setbacks contributed to the low expectations shared among the leaders of 
the American air forces. General Doolittle viewed the appalling losses suffered by the 
American Twelfth Air Force his an after action report on November 30 with 
disappointment but not surprise. It reported eight planes shot down by enemy aircraft, 
twelve destroyed by friendly and enemy ground fire, and an unprecedented forty-nine 
planes lost to accidents and unknown causes.
 In 
reality, American air units continued to suffer from numerous accidents. 
326 Doolittle admitted that he expected that 
“wastage from crashes, disappearances, and internments would be high in TORCH.”327
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Knowing the consequences of sending an inexperienced air force into battle, Doolittle 
understood that it was the only available option.  
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Conclusion: Lessons Learned  
In contrast to the highly trained and experienced RAF pilots, American airmen, 
especially those who flew fighter aircraft during Operation TORCH, were inexperienced 
and unprepared to such an extent that accidents and mishaps occurred.  My research 
augments Rick Atkinson’s work, An Army at Dawn, the first part of his Liberation 
Trilogy. In many ways these two arguments parallel each other. While my discussion is 
centered on aircraft, Atkinson’s work discussed ground forces. Much in the same way as 
American airmen, Atkinson concluded that the American ground forces’ unpreparedness 
and insufficient training caused poor performance and unnecessary casualties during the 
opening day of Operation TORCH, starting with the initial invasion on November 8, 
1942. Atkinson laid particular emphasis upon the frequent American calamites that 
occurred throughout the operation. He concluded that these incidents influenced a 
rethinking of American strategy and its implementation in modern warfare. I have taken 
his premise and applied it to the American air units involved in the opening days of 
TORCH and their performance. Most specifically, the U.S. Navy’s carrier launched F4F 
Wildcats, P-40s, and the few P-38 Lightnings flying for the United States Army Air 
Corps. I also include in my analysis the performance of ill-fated L-4 observation planes, 
which could not fully fulfill complete their mission, are also included in my analysis. 
 My conclusion also parallels that of Atkinson, in explaining why the Army Air 
Corps and the United States Naval aviators, who experienced so many losses attributed to 
pilot error, inexperience, and faulty training. Samuel Elliot Morrison’s meticulously 
detailed work on the actions of the Navy provided a solid resource for the full 
understanding of the aircraft carriers’ role in the operation which launched the Wildcats. 
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Morrison provided empirical evidence that allowed me to arrive at my conclusions. This 
work also served as a reference for locating the specific squadron numbers which led me 
to the archival records. These records contained after action reports, which documented 
the overwhelming number of accidents involving the aircraft based on the carriers. 
Norman Gelb’s findings highlighted the half trained and deficiently equipped quality of 
American Forces going into Operation TORCH. Information taken from after action 
reports further solidified my hypothesis.                                                                                                                                                            
Based upon a wide variety of primary sources, including the original after action 
reports, accounts from the VF-41, VF-9, VF-26, VF-28 Squadrons of F4F Wildcats, and 
diaries of Wildcat pilots flying combat sorties, I conclude that American pilots were not 
ready for combat on November 8, 1942. In order to place into context the American 
pilots’ unpreparedness, I turned to British pilots’ experience and training to offer a 
contrast. I examined the casual factors behind the pilots’ deficient performance by 
comparing the fighter pilot curriculum materials and pilot training textbooks of the 
American air forces to their British RAF counterparts’ more refined and detailed training 
texts and training materials. I drew upon a wide array of secondary, primary, 
photographic, and oral sources. These primary materials, key secondary sources, records 
of the training facilities, and pilot and cadet safety magazines uncovered the severity of 
training mishaps, as well as the substandard level of American pilot training when 
compared the RAF’s battle tested methods. 
My research and thesis fits into the scholarship on Operation TORCH and the war 
in the Mediterranean. They provide a fresh look at the Air Forces involved and the ill-
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trained state of the American pilots. My thesis falls into a consensus with other works on 
the subject, especially Atkinson’s, which agree that the American Military endured 
mistakes because of their unpreparedness. American aviation during Operation TORCH 
suffered from rushed and inadequate training, parallel to the shortcomings of ground and 
naval forces, as described by secondary sources. Just as Atkinson demonstrated that 
America’s ground troops were tested prematurely, during TORCH and the subsequent 
North African campaign, aviation at sunrise fared no better.  
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U.S. Navy Air Combat Casualties Operation TORCH 
 
 
 
Name/Rank Air Unit Date Remarks  
Lt. (j.g.) S.M. 
Amesbury 
VF-9 11/9 KIA 
Lt. (j.g) Charles V. 
August 
VF-41 11/8 Parachuted, POW 
ARM Geo. Biggs  VS-41 11/8 KIA 
Lt Cdr. John T. 
Blacknburn 
VGF-29 11/8 Ditched, rescued  
ARM Durward 
Balkley 
VGS-29 11/8  Wounded  
Lt. (j.g) G.M. Braun VF-9 11/8 Ditched, wounded, 
rescued  
Lt. G.H. Carter VF-41 11/8 Ditched, wounded, 
rescued 
AOM Jack Carter VGS-27 11/10 KIA 
Ens. A.B. Conner VF-41 11/8 Ditched, rescued  
Ens. Charles 
Dougherty 
BB. Mass 11/8 Shot down, POW 
Ens. Charles Duffy VS-41 11/8 KIA 
ARM Robt. C. 
Ethridge 
BB Mass 11/8 Shot down, 
wounded, POW 
Ens. Alfred Fecke  VGF-29 11/10 Force landing Safi, 
nosed over damaged 
plane on landing 
Ens. Uncas Fretwell VGF-29 11/8 Force landing Safi, 
nosed over 
Lt. T.A. Grell VF-41 11/8 Ditched rescued  
AOM Walter Gorka  VGS-27 11/10 KIA 
Lt. (j.g.) Mayo 
Hadden 
VF-9 11/9 Wounded 
ARM Alfred Hann VGS-29 11/8 Crashed takeoff 
Santee, rescued  
AOM Geo. 
Hinckley 
VGS-29 11/10 Wounded 
S. Harry P. Kimball VGS-29 11/8 Crashed takeoff 
Santee, rescued  
ARM Herman 
Ludwig 
VGS-29 11/8 Crashed takeoff 
Santee, rescued  
ARM Robert K. 
McConnell 
VGS-29 11/9 Wounded 
Ens. A.L Menard VF-9 11/9 Crashed on Ranger 
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Ens. C.E. Mikronis VF-41 11/8 Parachuted, 
wounded, POW 
Ens. William P. 
Naylor 
VGF-29 11/8 Force landing 
Mazagan, POW 
Ens. Robt. O’Neil VGS-27 11/10  KIA 
ARM Aubra 
Patterson 
VS-41 11/8 KIA 
Ens. Robt. Paterson VGF-29 11/8 Force Landing 
Mazagan, POW 
Lt. (j.g.) Donald C. 
Rodeen 
VGS-29 11/9 AA, crash landing, 
wounded, POW 
Lt. William Staggs  VGS-29 11/9 Wounded  
AMM Enoch 
Tarsilla 
VGS-29 11/9 AA, crash landing, 
POW 
Lt. (j.g.) Chas. A 
Sheilds 
VF-41 11/8 Parachuted, POW 
Ens. John 
Thompson 
VGS-29 11/10 Forced landing Safi 
Lt (j.g.) Geo. 
Trumpter 
VGF-29 11/10 KIA 
Ens. Edward 
VanVranken 
VGF-29 11/8 Force landing 
Mazagan, POW 
Ens. Chas. 
Warnstaff 
VGS-29 11/8 Crashed takeoff 
Santee, rescued  
Ens. T.M. Wihoite  VF-9 11/8 KIA 
Lt T.H. Winters Jr. VF-9 11/8  Wounded  
Lt. M.T. Wordell VF-41 11/8 Crash landed, 
wounded, POW 
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U.S. Navy Aircraft Losses All Causes Operation TORCH  
Carrier Air Group Aircraft Type  Number Lost 
Ranger F4F-4 12 
 SBD-3 3 
 Total 15 
Suwannee F4F-4 3 
 TBF-1 2 
 Total 5 
Sangamon SBD-3 2 
 TBF-1 1 
 Total 3 
Santee F4F-4 10 
 SBD-3 4 
 TBF-1 7 
 Total 21 
All Carrier Groups  Total 44 
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